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ABSTRACT 
 
With the Directive 2009/28/EC, the EU has identified the strategic plans to combat climate 
change by proposing short and medium-term measures to be realized by 2020. Achieving this 
will require high shares of renewable energy supply (RES-E) in the electricity system. To this 
end, Italy has significantly encouraged renewable energy through a variety of support schemes. 
As a result, production of electricity from these green sources, in particular from wind and solar 
(variable renewable energy, VRE) has risen considerably over the past years. Because of their 
weather-driven nature, and their out-of-merit dispatch, large-scale installations of wind and 
solar power are playing an increasingly important role in the supply and demand balance of 
electricity. Ultimately, that balance determines electricity prices in market-based systems. A 
clear understanding of the price effects of renewable energy in market-based electricity systems 
such as IPEX is needed. In this thesis, I estimated the impact of the country’s renewable energy 
policy on electricity prices and price volatility. I found evidence of the so-called merit order 
effect, MOE i.e. a short run electricity price reduction due to huge penetration of renewables, 
in the Italian electricity system and also taking into account the six zonal markets. The price 
reduction is also accompanied by an increase in electricity price volatility. Without further 
development of renewable electricity regulation and market adaption, these results can lead to 
market imperfections determining investments below the optimal level.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The worldwide demand for electricity has been growing considerably since the global 
industrialization. The growth of the global economy has been achieved at the expense of the 
environment, as most of the produced electricity is generated by fossil-fuel fire plants that harm 
the environment. This process of unsustainable growth has led to significant, unforeseen, and 
some extent to irreversible environmental damages. In the last couple of decades, we have seen 
two major development in the Italian electricity market. First, there has been a deregulation of 
the market leading to enhanced competition, and second a shift to electricity generation from 
renewable energy sources. Liberalization has been advocated and implemented precisely with 
the aim to increase efficiency, avoiding the monopolist distortion and letting market 
competition to rule and to increase transparency, disposing of the opaque cross-subsidization 
mechanism implicit in the management of the vertically integrated monopolist. With the 
Directive 2009/28/EC, the EU has identified the strategic plans to combat climate change by 
proposing short and medium-term measures to be achieved by 2020. The first target is to cut 
the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% below the 1990s levels.  The second target is to 
increase the energy consumption from renewable energy sources (RES) to 20% of the total 
demand. Given the difficulties of decarbonizing transport and heating, the electricity sector will 
continue to bear a significant burden arising from economy-wide decarbonization. Achieving 
this will require high shares of renewable energy supply (RES) in the electricity system, in light 
of the limited opportunities for expansion of hydropower and widespread resistance to nuclear 
power. Fortunately, rapid technological progress in wind and solar energy suggests that a high-
RES electricity system is not only a necessary outcome of the 2020 policy targets but also a 
realistic future scenario. The advent of variable RES with high upfront capital costs but very 
low short-run running costs has led to a reduced role for the market in guiding investment. 
Governments now dominate by setting the subsidy regimes and capacity mechanisms that 
determine new generation investment.  
Italy put in place a variety of support scheme to develop RES. They go from green certificates 
to feed-in tariffs and premium tariffs. The Italian RES incentives created a huge surge in 
installed capacity, especially in solar and wind. The promotion of renewable energy can 
increase electricity supply security, encourage the development of technology, support the 
national industry and create employment in the green economy. However, the expected increase 
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in renewable energy is also creating a debate about its costs. System operators and market 
participants face two main challenges as more renewable energy capacity is added. First, 
electricity generated by variable RES (wind turbines and photovoltaic panels) is intermittent 
and hardly adjustable to electricity demand. Therefore, variable renewable electricity 
generation cannot simply replace conventional energy sources. Second, Italy's renewable 
energy policy grants priority dispatch, i.e renewable electricity can be fed into the grid 
whenever it is produced, regardless of energy demand, and feed-in can be switched off only if 
grid stability is at risk. High levels of variable renewable electricity production can be balanced 
by adjusting the output from conventional power plants or by exporting excess electricity. 
Similarly, during times of too little wind or sunshine, sufficient dispatchable capacity has to be 
available to meet energy needs. The large increase which is to take place in these years brings 
about concern on how the cost of renewable policies may affect electricity prices. One of the 
prominent lines of research attempts to look at the impact of increased renewable energy target 
on electricity prices. Theoretical results affirm that an increase in renewable energy penetration 
should lower electricity prices since renewable energy has lower marginal costs and they 
displace marginal technologies with higher marginal costs (fuel, gas or coal).  The reduction 
essentially shifts rents from conventional electricity generators to consumers. Relatedly, 
wholesale price volatility increases. This potential reduction of electricity prices is very 
appealing for a political point of view. Indeed, it is being used as an argument for or against the 
deployment of renewable energy in many energy debates all over the world.  
The aim of this thesis is to further investigate the effects of intermittent renewable generation 
on the electricity price development in Italy. I’ll adopt a multivariate regression analysis and a 
seasonally adjusted autoregressive moving average (SARMA) model to explore the effect of 
renewable energy generation on the level and volatility of electricity prices. 
My work is structured as follows. Section 1 retraces the main steps that led to the definition of 
the structure of today's Italian electricity market. Section 2 illustrates the trend of renewables 
and the political-economic context in which we are heading. Section 3 offers some critical 
issues of the Merit-Order effect in the market structure. Section 4 performs the analysis of the 
Italian renewable efforts on the weekly electricity price level and volatility analyzing the impact 
at a national level and then at the zonal level. 
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Chapter 1 
ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
1.1 LIBERALIZATION PROCESS 
Electricity industry started at the end of the 19th century when local suppliers produced 
electricity for consumers near the production site, public illumination, and transportation. In 
order to develop the industry governments got involved in many ways in the industry: in Europe 
nationalization of the transmission and distribution systems became the most common way of 
acting after World War II.  
In Italy nationalization arrived in the 60s at the height of the economic boom, when politicians 
realized that electricity could be a great deal for an energy-consuming country like Italy. The 
Law of 6 December 1962, n. 1643 (so-called Nationalization Law), pursuing a unification of 
the national electricity system, put an end to a fragmentation of the electricity market that 
caused problems of stability, continuity, and quality of the services provided. About 1250 
private electric companies became of state property and management was entrusted to ENEL 
(National Agency for Electricity), an institute with the function of "ensuring, with minimum 
operating costs, the availability of electricity suitable for quantity and price to the needs of a 
balanced economic development of the country1". 
Electricity is not easily accumulated2 (it can not be stored and consumption must take place at 
the same time as the supply), the demand is subject to temporal and random variations, for 
transport it is possible to use only the already existing transmission network (the construction 
of new lines require time and considerable investment) and it is a good that needs ancillary 
services essential for the technical functioning of the electricity system and high investment 
costs, sustainable only with strong economies of scale. Because of these constraints, the 
electricity sector was almost a "natural monopoly3". This choice is understandable if one 
considers the reasons mentioned and the objective difficulties of creating an electricity market 
that would safeguard simultaneously strategic role and social power, the single tariff and the 
characteristic of public service. 
                                                 
1 Law n. 1643 of 6 December 1962 
2  If not with pumping systems that require modern and big technologies investments. 
 
3Production activity (and service) which by its nature had to be carried out by a single subject. 
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Thanks to the monopoly it was possible to achieve objectives otherwise impossible, as the 
almost complete electrification of the country together to the unification of the cost of 
electricity. 
At the end of the last century, the institutional, organizational and management structure of the 
electricity (and gas) industry has been profoundly innovated following the implementation of 
reforms aimed at improving supply essential services for economic development and social 
welfare. 
The European directive n. 92 of 19 December 1996, in order to open up the electricity market 
to competition, paying attention to environmental protection and wishing to enhance the 
efficiency of the electricity supply chain, imposed three principles: " i) the prohibition of 
granting exclusive schemes for production activities, import and export of electricity, and for 
the construction and use of lines transport; ii) freedom of access to transmission networks; iii) 
the gradual opening of the market, through the introduction of the figure of suitable customers, 
or users free to choose their supplier ". 
With the d.lgs n. 79 of 16 March 1999 (Bersani Decree4), Italy has implemented the Community 
Directive 96/92 / EC, providing that "the activities of production, import, export, purchase and 
sale of electricity are free ... The transmission and dispatching activities are reserved to the State 
and assigned in concession to the national transmission grid operator ... Electricity distribution 
is carried out under the concession regime issued by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Crafts". 
It is only with the Bersani decree that, in Italy, it we can talk about the liberalization of the 
electricity sector. 
Before the Bersani decree, ENEL's monopoly covered all phases of the electricity supply chain. 
ENEL dealt with the generation of electricity and the transmission and dispatching phases: the 
national transmission network, in fact, unique by nature, was owned and managed entirely by 
the monopolist. Regarding the distribution of electricity, the local networks were under 
concession and active both in sales and distribution. The sale carried out by the distributor, 
provided for regulated tariffs. Furthermore, it was not possible for the end customer to choose 
the supplier. 
Following the first liberalization, the generation and sales phases are open to competition, while 
the transmission phase is a natural monopoly. TERNA, since November 2005, owns and 
manages the network. The transmission and distribution phases are regulated and the tariffs, 
established by the AEEG, are applied uniformly throughout the national territory. The GRTN 
                                                 
4 This decree was adopted in compliance with art. 36 of the l. n. 128 of 1998, in which it was arranged that "in 
order to promote the liberalization of the energy sector, the Government is delegated to issue, within one year from 
the date of entry into force of this law, one or more legislative decrees to implement Directive 96/92 / EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and to redefine all relevant aspects of the national electricity system ". 
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becomes GSE. There purchase and sale of electricity take place within the Electricity Exchange, 
managed by the GME according to the bidding system, or through bilateral contracts. 
The post-liberalization of the electricity sector is configured as follows: 
 The activities of production, import, export, purchase, and sale of electricity are free. 
So, manufacturers, sellers, and importers are increasing and operating in competition. 
Many companies are involved in the generation such as Enel, Edison, Endesa Italia, ENI 
Group, Edipower, Tirreno Power, Acea Electrabel, Saras Group, AEM. 
 The transmission and dispatching activities are attributed to the State and to TERNA, 
owner of more than 90% network, and its remuneration is established by the AEEG. 
 The electricity distribution activity is carried out under a concession regime. The 
distribution is carried out by ENEL Distribuzione, SET Distribuzione, AEC, SECAB, 
and some Municipal 
 
1.2 THE SUBJECTS OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
The main subjects that contribute to the functioning of the electricity system - each with a 
specific role expressly defined by the legislation - are, in addition to the Parliament and the 
Government: 
 the Ministry of Economic Development (MSE) which, among other things, defines the 
strategic and operational guidelines for ensuring the safety and economy of the national 
electricity system; 
 the Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG), which guarantees the promotion of 
competition and efficiency in the electricity and gas sectors, with regulatory and control 
functions. With regard to the activity carried out by GME, the AEEG is responsible, 
inter alia, for the definition of the rules for dispatching economic merit and mechanisms 
for controlling market power; 
 Acquirente Unico, a joint-stock company set up by the National Transmission Grid 
Operator (currently the Energy Services Manager - GSE), which is assigned the task of 
purchasing electricity on the most favorable conditions on the market and selling it to 
distributors or retailers, supply to small consumers who do not buy on the free market. 
To this end the AU can buy electricity on the power exchange or through bilateral 
contracts; 
 Terna S.p.A., which safely manages the national transmission grid and electricity flows 
through dispatching, i.e. balancing energy supply and demand 365 days a year, 24 hours 
a day;  
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 Gestore dei Servizi Energetici (GSE), a public limited company with a central role in 
the promotion, incentive, and development of renewable sources in Italy. The sole 
shareholder of the GSE is the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which exercises the 
rights of the shareholder jointly with the Ministry of Economic Development. The GSE 
controls the companies Acquirente Unico (AU S.p.A.), Gestore dei Mercati Energetici 
(GME S.p.A.) and Ricerca sul Sistema Energetico (RSE S.p.A.). 
 Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME), which organizes and manages the energy 
market, according to criteria of neutrality, transparency, objectivity, as well as 
competition between producers 
 
 
1.3 THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY CHAIN 
The national electricity system is an organized network system in which, in a free energy 
market, the activities that characterize it are distinct and carried out by different subjects. The 
activities concern the production, transmission, and distribution of electricity. The energy 
production, a liberalized activity, involves the transformation of the primary sources of energy 
into electricity in the power stations, i.e. in the production centers, and then transferring it to 
the consumption areas through a network system composed of lines, power stations, and 
transformation stations. The transmission, regulated activity, allows the transport of energy 
from production centers scattered throughout the territory or imported from abroad, to 
consumption centers. The network functions as a system of communicating vessels, in which 
all the energy injected is withdrawn, without it being possible to establish from which system 
the energy consumed comes from. The last phase that concludes the supply chain of the national 
electricity system is represented by the distribution, also regulated activity, which consists of 
the delivery of medium and low voltage electricity to users. 
SYSTEM 
SEGMENTS 
STRUCTURE PRICE REGIME MAIN OPERATORS 
Production and 
import 
Free Market price Enel,  Endesa, 
Edipower, Enipower, 
Tirrenopower, ACEA 
Electrabel, ACEGAS, 
AEM Milano, AEM 
Torino, ASM Brescia, 
EDF, EGL, Atel, 
Verbund, HSE 
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Transmission and 
dispatching 
National monopoly Administered by 
AEEG 
Terna S.p.A 
Distribution Local monopoly Regulated, price cap 
defined by AEEG 
Enel distribuzione, 
ACEA distribuzione, 
AEM Milano, AEM 
Torino, ASM  Brescia 
and other local 
distributors 
Sale Free Market price Enel eneria, ACEA 
trading, AEM trading, 
Edison trading… 
Table 1 Phases of the electric system. Source: tpg.unige.it, 2016. 
1.3.1 PRODUCTION 
Electricity is a secondary energy source: as long as we cannot directly capture and use lightning, 
we will have to continue producing it. Production is the main function involved in the electric 
system: generating electricity is a complex task and can derive from a variety of sources. 
Electricity is usually generated at a power station fueled by chemical combustion or nuclear 
fission but also by other means such as the energy of owing water and wind. Electricity can also 
be generated by solar photovoltaic and geothermal power.  
The thermoelectric plants are the most widespread in the world and the common threesome of 
fuels most used as a source of heat is also common: coal (the most used in the world), oil and 
natural gas (today the most used in Italy). Today the advantages of the traditional thermoelectric 
are those typical of a mature technology and with numerous consolidated "variants" - the gas 
turbine power plants, the combined cycle and others - that make it possible to make exploit the 
better of the fuel, polluting less, and arriving to supply power order of the Gigawatt (GW) 
continuously and for prolonged periods of time. The disadvantages are basically three: the same 
source of energy, which is not renewable but destined to run out; the variability of the fuel price, 
which affects the price of energy; the pollution produced by burning oil, coal and, to a lesser 
extent, natural gas (methane), with all that follows in terms of environmental impact at the local 
level (smog and dust) and planetary (global warming and climate change). Among the most 
interesting technologies, there is a very efficient evolution of the gas plant: it is the combined 
cycle (CCGT, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine). Recovery is the concept that underlies this 
solution: in short, the hot mixture of air and gas (at 500-600 ° C) that rotates the gas turbine, 
leaving the first system still contains enough energy to operate a steam turbine. There is not just 
one type of combined cycle, but in general, for all its variants, the overall effect is more than 
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50% compared to 30-35% of traditional steam turbines. This level of efficiency allows reducing 
both consumption and emissions compared to conventional systems. 
SOURCE (GWh) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Thermoelectric production 205.075 176.897 157.439 172.658 179.839 
Solids 49.141 45.104 43.455 43.201 35.608 
Natural Gas 129.058 109.876 93.637 110.860 126.023 
Oil products 7.023 5.418 4.764 5.620 4.127 
Others 19.852 16.499 15.583 12.976 14.081 
HYDRO pumping 1.979 1.898 1.711 1.432 1.825 
Production from RES 92.222 111.999 120.677 108.904 107.654 
HYDRO 41.875 52.773 58.545 45.537 42.250 
WIND 13.407 14.897 15.178 14.844 17.648 
Solar 18.862 21.589 22.306 22.942 22.104 
Geothermal 5.592 5.650 5.916 6.185 6.289 
Biomass and waste 12.487 17.090 18.732 19.396 19.363 
TOTAL PRODUCTION 299.276 290.794 279.827 282.994 289.318 
Table 2 Production from sources. Source: Elaboration of AEEGSI Terna’s data. 
There are also systems that achieve even higher returns (80-85%), for example, the so-called 
cogeneration, where a common internal combustion engine - for example, that of a car - is 
applied directly to a power generator and exhaust gases they are used to heat water for sanitary 
use or for heating. The size of these solutions is however limited, from a few kilowatts to a 
dozen Megawatt, suitable for a local production (small industries, condominiums), and have for 
now little diffusion.  
Production from renewable sources has grown significantly in recent years. Renewable energies 
- solar energy, solar (thermal and photovoltaic), hydraulic, WIND, geothermal and biomass - 
are a fundamental alternative to fossil fuels. Their use makes it possible to reduce not only 
greenhouse gas emissions from energy production and consumption but also the country's 
dependence on imported fossil fuels (in particular gas and oil). 
 
1.3.2 TRANSMISSION AND DISPATCHING 
The network system, which characterizes the national electricity system, provides that 
transmission and dispatching activities are subject to very stringent technical constraints, such 
as: 
 The request for an instant and continuous balancing between the quantities of energy 
fed into the network and those taken from the network, net of transport and distribution 
losses; 
 The maintenance of the frequency and the voltage of the network energy within a very 
narrow range, to protect the safety of the plants; 
 The need for the energy flows on each individual power line not to exceed the maximum 
permissible transit limits on the power line itself. 
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Even minimal deviations from any of the above parameters, for more than a few seconds, can 
quickly lead to systemic states of crisis. The characteristics of the technologies and the ways in 
which electricity is produced, transported and consumed make compliance with these 
constraints even more complicated. 
In particular, the difficulties arise from three factors: 
1) variability, inelasticity, and non-rationality of the demand: the power demand on the 
network exhibits considerable short-term (hourly) and medium-term variability (weekly 
and seasonal); 
2) absence of storage and dynamic constraints to the real-time adaptation of the offer: 
electricity cannot be stored in significant quantities, if not indirectly, and in the case of 
the type of "basin" hydroelectric plants, through the quantity of water contained in the 
basins themselves; moreover, electrical systems have minimum and maximum limits to 
the power that can be supplied, as well as minimum activation times and variation in 
the power supplied; 
3) externalities on the network: once injected into the network, the energy engages all the 
available power lines as in a system of communicating vessels, sharing itself according 
to complex physical laws determined by the balance of inputs and withdrawals; this 
makes the path of energy untraceable, so that any local imbalance, not promptly 
compensated, spreads across the entire network through variations in voltage and 
frequency. 
Transmission it is the activity of transport and transformation of electricity on the 
interconnected high voltage network and very high voltage5 for the purpose of delivery to 
customers, distributors, and recipients of self-produced energy. This activity is carried out by 
Terna. In order for this to happen, lines, power stations, and transformation stations are needed, 
that is, the elements that make up the Transmission Network6 a collection of over 72,000 km of 
lines owned and managed by Terna. 
The high degree of complexity and coordination necessary to guarantee the functioning of the 
system require the identification of a central coordinator with control over all the production 
facilities belonging to the system. This subject, known as a dispatcher, is the fulcrum of the 
electrical system and has the task of ensuring its operation in conditions of maximum safety to 
ensure continuity and quality of service. In fact, it ensures that production always equals 
                                                 
5 AAT-AT= 380 kV - 220 kV - 150 kV 
6 The transmission network (RTN) is formed, therefore, from very high and high voltage lines, from transformation 
and / or sorting stations, as well as from interconnection lines that allow the exchange of electricity with foreign 
countries. 
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consumption and that frequency and voltage do not deviate from optimal values, respecting the 
limits of transit on the networks and the dynamic constraints on the generation plants. 
Terna carries out dispatching activities, i.e. the task of balancing the system in real time. The 
necessary balance between inputs and withdrawals in every moment and in every node of the 
network is guaranteed by the automatic regulation and control systems of the production units 
(so-called primary and secondary reserve), which increase or reduce the input into the network 
in order to compensate for any unbalance on the network itself. The dispatcher actively 
intervenes - by sending to the tertiary reserve units orders for ignition, increase or reduction of 
the power supplied - only when the operating margins of the automatic control systems are 
lower than the safety standards in order to reintegrate them. 
The electrical system is divided into portions of transmission networks - defined zones - for 
which, for the purposes of the safety of the electrical system, physical limits of energy transit 
exist with the corresponding neighboring areas. These transit limits are determined on the basis 
of a calculation model based on the balance between electricity generation and consumption. 
The Italian electricity system is therefore divided into market zones, aggregates of geographical 
and/or virtual areas, each characterized by a zonal energy price.  
The process of identifying the areas of the relevant network takes into account the Triennial 
Development Plan of the National Transmission Grid. The areas of the relevant network can 
correspond to physical geographic areas, to virtual areas (i.e. without a direct physical 
correspondent), or be limited production poles, i.e. virtual areas whose production is subject to 
constraints for the safe management of the system electric.  
For the purpose of verifying and removing any congestion caused by the injection and 
withdrawal schedules - whether they are determined on the market or in execution of bilateral 
contracts - GME uses a simplified representation of the network, which only shows the most 
relevant transit limits, or the transit limits between the national geographical areas, the foreign 
areas and the limited production poles.  
Figure 1 Virtual areas and geographical areas of the transmission network, source VADEMECUM DELLA BORSA 
ELETTRICA, 2009. 
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The national transmission network is interconnected with 
abroad through 22 lines: 4 with France; 12 with Switzerland; 
1 with Austria; 2 with Slovenia and 1 cable in direct current 
with Greece, in addition to the SACOI direct current 
connection connecting Sardinia to the continent via Corsica 
and to a further AC7 cable between Sardinia and Corsica, 
and to the SAPEI direct current connection which connects 
Sardinia with the peninsula. The conformation of these 
areas is functional to the management of the transits along 
the peninsula taken by Terna which can be summarized as: 
 6 geographical areas (Center - North, North, Center - 
South, South, Sicily, Sardinia); 
 8 virtual foreign areas (France, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, BSP, Corsica, Corsica 
AC, Greece); 
 4 national virtual zones representing limited production poles, i.e. interconnection 
capacity with the network is lower than the installed power of the units themselves. 
 
 
1.3.3 DISTRIBUTION AND SALE 
The distribution networks represent the capillary extension on the territory of transmission lines 
and transfer electricity to all final customers. These networks serve consumers, which go from 
big industrial plants (connected often to high voltage network) to domestic customers. 
The sale of electricity can take place either through bilateral bargaining between seller and 
buyer (the sale takes place directly between the two parties) or through the negotiation on the 
Power Exchange between seller and buyer (electronically). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Alternative current. 
Figure 2 Six geographical areas. 
source VADEMECUM DELLA BORSA 
ELETTRICA, 2009. 
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1.4 ITALIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The Italian Power Exchange (IPEX8- Italia Power Exchange), established in Italy from 1 April 
2004 and fully operational since January 2005, constitutes the place where the supply of 
producers meets consumer and wholesaler’s electricity demand. It represents an organized 
system able to favor both competitions in relation to the production and sale of electricity, and 
the protection of end customers thanks to maximum transparency guaranteed by the unified 
coordination of the electricity market entrusted to the Electricity Market Operator (GME).  
It is a telematic marketplace in which electricity is traded wholesale. The price of electricity is 
that of equilibrium that arises from the encounter between supply and demand. Unlike other 
European energy markets, IPEX is not a purely financial market aimed solely at determining 
prices and quantities, but it is a real physical market where the where the electricity supply and 
withdrawal programs are defined in (and from) the network according to the criterion of 
economic merit.   
The Electricity Market includes: the spot market (MPE), the forward market with the obligation 
of delivery and collection (MTE) and in the Platform for the physical delivery of financial 
contracts concluded on IDEX. 
 
1.4.1 THE SPOT MARKET (MPE) 
Is divided into three sub-markets: 
1) THE DAY AHEAD MARKET (MGP) 
The Day Ahead Market (MGP), is a market for the exchange of electricity for the next day. The 
MGP is organized according to an implicit auction model and hosts most of the electricity 
demand and supply transactions. 
The MGP session opens at 08.00 on a ninth day before the day of delivery and closes at 09.15 
of the day before the day of delivery. Then according to the economic merit order criterion and 
to the capacity limits of the transmission lines between zones, offers and bids can be accepted. 
The accepted supply offers are evaluated at the clearing price of the zone. This price is the 
equilibrium price determined on an hourly basis by the intersection of the demand and supply 
curves. Hence the zonal market clearing prices are those prices observed on several zones or 
areas, and they can differ across zones if a proportion of the grid becomes congested and so 
                                                 
8 Name with which the Italian electric stock exchange is known abroad. The platform is the main instrument 
through which implement the provisions of the legislative decree n. 79/1999 for the realization of the free market 
Energy.  
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separated from the entire network (Weron, 2006). On the other hand, the accepted demand bids 
are evaluated at the single national price (Prezzo Unico d’Acquisto, PUN) which is the purchase 
price for end customers and it is computed as the average of the zonal prices weighted by zonal 
consumptions. 
 
 
Figure 3 Determination of the equilibrium price. source VADEMECUM DELLA BORSA ELETTRICA, 2009. 
Analyzing figure 4, the intersection of the two curves determines: the total quantity exchanged, 
the equilibrium price, the accepted offers and the input and withdrawal programs obtained as 
the sum of the accepted offers referred, in the same hour, to the same point of supply. 
 If the flows on the network deriving from the programs do not violate any transit limit, 
the equilibrium price is unique in all areas and equal to P *. The accepted offers are 
those with a sales price not higher than P * and with a purchase price not lower than P*. 
 If at least one limit is violated, an algorithm "separates" the market into two market 
zones - one in export that includes all the zones upstream of the constraint and one in 
import that includes all the areas downstream of the constraint - and repeats in each of 
them the crossing process described above, constructing, for each market area, an offer 
curve (which includes all the sales offers presented in the same area as well as the 
maximum quantity imported) and a demand curve (which includes all offers of purchase 
presented in the area itself, as well as a quantity equal to the maximum quantity 
exported). The result is a different zonal equilibrium price (Pz) in the two market zones. 
In particular, the Pz is larger in the importing market area and is smaller in the exporting 
one. If as a result of this solution further transit restrictions are violated, within each 
market area, the process of subdivision, or "market splitting", is repeated even within 
this area until an outcome compatible with the network constraints. 
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Figure 4 Zonal price algorithm with a single price for consumers. Source: own elaboration on VADEMECUM DELLA BORSA 
ELETTRICA, 2009. 
 
OTC CONTRACTS: The energy exchanged by virtue of bilateral negotiations recorded on the 
PCE9 participates in the process described above, both because it helps to commit a share of the 
available transport capacity on the transits, and because it helps to determine the weighting 
amounts of the National Single Price. The programs registered on the PCE are sent to the MGP 
in the form of offers and contribute to the determination of the outcomes of the MGP itself. 
 
2) INTRADAY MARKET (MI) 
Allows operators to update sales and offers of purchase and their commercial positions with a 
frequency similar to that of a continuous negotiation with respect to the variations of 
information on the status of production facilities and consumption needs. Now the zonal prices 
are used to evaluate the accepted purchase bids 
The MI10 takes place in four sessions: MI1, MI2, MI3, and MI4: the first two organized on the 
day d-1 after the MGP (MI1 and MI2)11, and the second two intraday sessions (MI3 and MI4)12 
are organized on the day d13. 
                                                 
9 Electricity Account Registration Platform (PCE): Entrusted to GME, it is the platform for the registration of 
electricity futures contracts, concluded outside the MPE and, in particular, on the MTE or on a bilateral basis (so-
called over the counter or OTC) and the corresponding input and withdrawal programs. 
10 Introduced with the law 2/09 
11 operational since October 31, 2009 
12 introduced from 1 January 2011 
13 Delivery day 
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The sessions are organized in the form of implicit energy auctions with different closing times 
and in succession, through which the operators can both carry out a better control of the state 
of the production plants and update the withdrawal programs of consumption units, taking into 
account more up-to-date information about the status of their production facilities, the needs 
for energy for the next day and market conditions.  
At the end of each session of MI, GME, as it did for the conclusion of the MGP, communicates 
to Terna the relevant results for the purposes of dispatching with transits and updated schedules 
of imputing and withdrawals. 
 
3) ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKET (MSD) 
It is the instrument through which Terna SpA, in the role of the network manager, procures the 
resources necessary for the management and control of the system (resolution of intra-zonal 
congestions, the creation of the energy reserve, real-time balancing). On the MSD, Terna 
stipulates the purchase and sale contracts for the procurement of resources for the dispatching 
service and acts as a central counterparty to the negotiations. In the MSD, offers/bids are 
accepted by economic Merit Order, taking into account the need for ensuring the correct 
operation of the system. Offer/bids accepted in the MSD are valued at the offered price (Pay as 
bid14). On the MSD the offers can be referred only to the offer points enabled for trading on 
this market and must be submitted only by the respective and direct users of the dispatching 
without the possibility of using the institution of delegation. 
The MSD is divided into a programming phase (ex-ante MSD) and the Balancing Market (MB). 
On MSD ex-ante, offers/bids are selected for the relevant periods of the following calendar day 
to the one in which the session ends. On the ex-ante MSD, Terna accepts offers to purchase and 
sell energy for relieving congestions and creating an adequate reserve margin15. The ex-ante 
MSD is articulated in particular in three programming sub-phases: MSD1, MSD2, and MSD3. 
The Balancing Market (MB) concerns offers/bids that Terna has accepted in real time for 
balancing injections and withdrawals (by sending balancing commands); it takes place in 
several sessions, according to the provisions of the dispatching regulations. 
 
                                                 
14 Valuation rule adopted on the MSD, based on which each offer is valued at its offer price.  
15 Capacity margin with respect to forecast demand that Terna S.p.A. creates to offset deviations between 
electricity generation and consumption. 
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Table 3 Structure of the spot market's (MPE) session. source VADEMECUM DELLA BORSA ELETTRICA, 2009.  
 
 MGP MI MSD 
EXCHANGED 
RESOURCE 
energy energy Energy for 
resolution of intra-
zonal congestions 
Energy for real-
time balancing 
UNIT 
ADMITTED TO 
PARTICIPATE 
Offer points  Offer points enabled for dispatching 
services 
OPERATORS Market operators Market operators Dispatching users Dispatching users 
PRICE Equilibrium price Equilibrium price Offer price Offer price 
Table 4 Organizational scheme of MPE. Source: own elaboration on VADEMECUM DELLA BORSA 
ELETTRICA, 2009. 
 
1.4.2 FORWARD ELECTRICITY MARKET (MTE) 
It is the venue for the negotiation of electricity futures contracts with the obligation of delivery 
and withdrawal of the same, which can be attended by all the operators admitted to the 
Electricity Market. 
On this market, GME acts as a central counterparty and registers on the PCE - at the end of the 
relevant trading period, or, during the same period, following a specific request by the operator 
- the net delivery position, corresponding to the purchases and sale concluded by the operator 
on the MTE, being GME a qualified market operator and for this holder of an energy account 
on the PCE.  
Two types of contracts are tradable on MTE, which underlying amount of energy is set by GME 
at 1 MW, multiplied by the relevant periods underlying the contract. The types are: 
- Baseload, whose underlying is the electricity to be delivered in all the relevant periods of the 
days belonging to the delivery period; 
- Peakload, whose underlying is the electricity to be delivered in the relevant periods from the 
ninth to the twentieth of the days included in the delivery period, excluding Saturdays and 
Sundays. 
These types of contracts are negotiable with the following delivery periods: month, quarter and 
year.  
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The operators participate presenting proposals in which they indicate the type and period of 
delivery of contracts, number of contracts, price at which they are willing to buy/sell. 
GME organizes a trading book for each type of contract and for each delivery period. On this 
book, the offers are ordered on the basis of the price: in descending order for the purchase offers 
and in increasing order for the offers of sale. At the same price, the time priority for placing the 
offer is valid. Offers without price limit have maximum price priority. 
 
1.4.3 PLATFORM FOR PHYSICAL DELIVERY OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
CONCLUDED ON IDEX (CDE16) 
GME has entered into a collaboration agreement with Borsa Italiana SpA17, which manages the 
energy derivatives market - IDEX -, in order to allow, through the electricity market managed 
by GME, operators participating in both markets, to regulate by means of physical delivery, the 
financial contracts with an electric sub-fund concluded on IDEX.  
The agreement drawn up between GME and Borsa Italiana for the integration between the 
derivatives market managed by Borsa and the Electricity Market managed by GME, provides 
that operators who have an open position on IDEX can exercise, on this market, an option of 
physical delivery, requiring in this way that its position is regulated by physical delivery 
through the GME market. 
With reference to the position that the operator has accrued on IDEX for the following month, 
the physical delivery option can be exercised on the third trading day before the start of the 
relevant delivery month.  
The exercise of the physical delivery option entails for the trader, in relation to the transfer of 
his position to GME, the conclusion, on the platform for the physical delivery of derivatives on 
the energy of the electricity market - CDE -, of a transaction of purchase / sale of the underlying 
energy of the delivered position, which has GME as its counterpart. This transaction is valued 
at the settlement price of the fourth trading day before the month of delivery, plus VAT, where 
applicable.  
 
 
 
                                                 
16 With the publication of the Decree of the Ministry of Economic Development, 29 April 2009, the Ministry set 
the guidelines for the evolution of GME's organized futures markets. In particular, the art. 10 paragraph 6 
established that GME should seek forms of "collaboration with the management company of the regulated market 
of derivatives on electrical underlying". 
17 Regulated market management company authorized by Consob to exercise the stock exchange market for the 
trading of financial instruments 
16 
 
1.5 RESULTS OF THE LIBERALIZATION 
The results brought about by liberalization, in the short term, were above all the improvement 
in the quality of the electric service, the reduction of supply interruptions and a greater 
qualitative standardization of the service from North to South. In addition, clearer rules have 
been defined to protect the rights of small consumers. The activation of new operators, both 
Italian and foreign, and the service of intermediation that these exercise, are, moreover, 
essential prerogatives for a competitive market. Regarding the tariffs, there has been a 
considerable reduction in production costs and service delivery, around 20%, the cost of raw 
materials, however, changes with the oscillation of world prices. 
Investments in a generation were initially blocked due to uncertainty caused by the new change. 
They, however, resumed after the first five years, thus determining a greater efficiency and a 
relative reduction of the production costs. Finally, the establishment of the Power Exchange 
allowed for more transparent transactions and the possibility of collective purchase by a single 
entity (AU), to protect those (constrained) customers who, in the early years, have not been 
admitted at the free market. 
The prices of the electricity market have undergone the reflection of several factors that 
accompanied liberalization. In the years immediately following liberalization, the amount of 
electricity that was placed on the liberalized market derived from importation at very low prices, 
especially nuclear purchased mainly from France. So, the first effect on the price, following the 
liberalization, was certainly positive.  
Subsequently, domestic production in the country was added to low-price imports.  
The electricity generation mix has been optimized with substantial investments addressed to 
the activation of high-efficiency gas plants. However, the (largely obligatory) recourse to 
electricity produced from renewable sources has led to a reduction in the time of use of gas 
power plants (modern and efficient). The final price, therefore, comes from the sum of the costs 
deriving from the production of energy from renewable sources, and the greater cost deriving 
from the reduced recourse to traditional power stations which, although efficient, remain under-
utilized. The consequence of these factors has therefore led to an increase in production costs. 
Regarding the long-term effects of liberalization today it is necessary to review the current 
organizational structure of the electricity system in terms of sustainability for the country, 
taking into account the global economic crisis and the changed priorities of energy policy.  
The economic and financial crisis highlighted the risk of the substantial level of investment in 
generation capacity in the previous decade. This substantial growth in investments in generation 
capacity, however, was not accompanied by an equally high growth in consumption. This has 
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led to an excess of production capacity compared to the actual need to cover the needs. Another 
contributing factor to the increase in supply capacity was the simultaneous increase in 
interconnection capacity with foreign countries. 
The new energy policy priorities suggest a future growth in the riskiness of the investment in 
generation capacity. The increase in renewable production has led to a sharp decrease in the 
time (hours) of the operation of thermoelectric plants (coal plants, oil products, turbo gas, 
combined cycle, methane gas). Therefore, these plants are unlikely to cover fixed costs. 
Considering the reduced number of operating hours of these plants, this problem has a negative 
impact, especially for those companies that have activated the system of production plants for 
a short time, reducing the profitability of their investments at a short distance from their 
realization. This means incentives for renewables can be the cause of greater risk for both 
producers and those who have invested in generating capacity. The structure of the sector is 
therefore the result of an interaction between the investment choices that the operators take 
autonomously, and those induced by public intervention for the purpose of environmental 
sustainability. The increased production capacity from renewable sources also entails lower 
variable costs, or even negative, that characterize the supply curve. The direct consequence is 
an extremely variable electricity price. 
In the following chapter, we are going to analyze the renewable energy policy and the status of 
renewables in Italy 
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Chapter 2 
RENEWABLES IN THE ITALIAN 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
Processes like the production of energy, its transformation, and its use have an environment-
impact as they release polluting substances into the atmosphere. In all the developed and 
emerging countries, we are witnessing a steady growth in the use of electricity, most of this 
produced some time ago by thermoelectric plants.  
In the last decade, in order to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, due to the growing increase in 
concentrations of atmospheric pollutants, initiatives promoting the production of energy from 
renewable sources have become a priority. The advantages deriving from their use are the 
absence of polluting emissions into the atmosphere (with the exception of biomass) and their 
inexhaustibility. The renewable energy sources associated with these resources are therefore 
solar energy, wind energy, hydroelectric power, and geothermal sources, or those sources 
whose current use does not affect their availability in the future. 
 
 2.1 FROM THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT TO THE NATIONAL 
ONE: NREAP 
The promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources (RES) is among the 
priorities of the European Union (EU) for reasons of security and diversification of energy 
supply, for reasons of environmental protection and for reasons linked to economic and social 
cohesion. 
With the Directive 2009/28 / EC18, the EU has identified the strategic plans to combat climate 
change by proposing short and medium-term measures aimed at the adoption of the following 
energy measures («20-20-20» of the Community) to be realized by 2020: 
 + 20% of energy from renewable sources in final energy consumption19; 
 - 20% of energy consumption compared to the trend scenario, through efficiency 
energy; 
                                                 
18 repealed Directive 2001/77 / EC on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the 
internal electricity market, which set the target of 21% of gross domestic energy consumption from renewable 
energy sources for member states by 2010. 
19 This is the overall target. Targets for renewable energy in each country vary from a minimum of 10% in Malta 
to 72% of total energy use in Iceland. 
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 - 20% of emissions into the atmosphere. 
Each Member State is required to adopt a National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP), 
identifying strategies and implementing measures to improve energy efficiency in energy 
consumption and to increase the role of renewables in the transport sectors, electricity, and heat.  
Italy adopted its NREAP in June 2010. With the Legislative Decree 3/3/2011, n. 28 defined the 
methods and criteria for the implementation of the measures envisaged by the NREAP, in line 
with the indications of the European Directive 28 of 2009. 
Among the general objectives they take on particular importance: 
 the security of energy supplies, considering that Italy depends heavily on energy 
imports. Oil supply disruptions as a result of political events in Libya in 2011 and 
reductions in gas supplies from Russia through Ukraine are recent examples of the 
problematic situation; 
 the reduction of emissions of harmful gases for the climate (CO2, CH4, ...) according 
to the commitments undertaken at the international level (Kyoto agreement and 
following); 
 improving the competitiveness of the national industry through support for the 
demand for renewable technologies and the development of technological innovation. 
The development of renewable sources can be an element of economic development, 
employment, and investment for the country.  
The areas of intervention of the lines of action are the transport, thermal and electrical sectors.  
The objectives of the NREAP are to be achieved by 2020; the percentage comparisons are 
calculated with respect to the values of 2005, a year taken as a reference at a European level.  
Regarding the objectives for renewable energy, Italy has assumed for the year 2020 the 
objective to cover with energy from renewable sources 17% of gross final energy consumption. 
The expected total energy consumption in 2020 is 133.042 ktoe20. The amount of energy from 
renewable sources in the target year 2020 should be 22.617 ktoe. Italy's NREAP sets a target of 
the share of renewable energies to be 17,09% in the heating/cooling sector, 10,14% in the 
transport sector and 26,39% in the electricity sector by 2020. Therefore, the development of 
renewable sources in the production of electricity remains a strategic action line. To increase 
the percentage of electricity consumption covered by renewable sources while ensuring 
efficiency and acceptable costs, it is necessary that the electricity system is adequate in its 
infrastructure; in particular, it is necessary to aim at the realization of the so-called smart grids, 
                                                 
20 The tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy defined as the amount of energy released by burning one 
tonne of crude oil.  In electricity, 1MW= 0.187 toe. 
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capable of realizing efficient forms of storage, accumulation, collection and sorting of the 
electricity produced. 
The table below illustrates the objectives that Italy intends to achieve in the three sectors - 
electricity, heat, transport - for the purpose of meeting the targets set, comparing the reference 
year 2005, the intermediate situation to 2008 and the forecasts for 2020. 
 2005 2008 2020 
RES GFC RES/GFC RES GFC RES/GFC RES GFC RES/GFC 
Mtoe Mtoe % Mtoe Mtoe % Mtoe Mtoe % 
electric 4,84 29,74 16% 5,04 30,39 16,58% 9,11 31,44 28,97 % 
heat 1,91 68,5 2,8% 3,23 58,53 5,53% 9,52 60,13 15,83% 
transport 0,17 42,97 0,42% 0,723 42,61 1,7% 2,52 39,63 6,38% 
total 6,94 141,2 4,91% 9 131,5 6,84% 22,3 131,2 17% 
Table 5 Summary National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP). Source: elaboration of Zanichelli on data from Ministry 
of Economic Development, 2012. 
2.2 RENEWABLES SITUATION IN ITALY 
At the end of 2016, 742,340 electric power plants powered by renewable sources were installed 
in Italy; this number is almost entirely made up of photovoltaic systems (98.6%). The gross 
efficient capacity of installed renewable energy plants exceeds 52,000 MW, with an increase 
compared to 2015 of almost 800 MW (+ 1.5%); this growth is mainly driven by solar sources 
(+380 MW) and wind (+250 MW). In the 13 years between 2003 and 2016, the gross efficient 
power installed in Italy rose from 19,663 MW to 52,273 MW, an increase of 32,610 MW and 
an average annual growth rate of 7.2%; the years with the greatest increases in power are 2011 
and 2012.  
 
Figure 5 Evolution of the installed power of renewable energy plants. Source: Elaboration of GSE on Tena and GSE’s data, 
rapporto statistico 2016. 
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Since the beginning of the 20th century, the national electric park has been characterized by the 
widespread diffusion of hydroelectric plants; in the most recent years, the installed capacity of 
these plants has remained almost constant (+ 0.7% on average per year), while all the other 
renewable sources have grown considerably thanks mainly to the various public incentive 
systems. 
 
Figure 6 RES gross efficient power (MWh). Source: le rinnovabili nel 2017, GSE. 
In North Italy, it is present the greater concentration of installed power of the country, with 
almost 50% of the national production. This result is driven by region Lombardy which 
accounts for 15.7% of the total installed power at the national level.  
Electricity from renewable sources actually produced, calculated by applying the criteria 
established by Directive 2009/28 / EC, is equal to 110,528 GWh, of which renewables 
contributed 37.3% to the total gross production. Compared to Gross Domestic consumption 
(the difference between gross production and the external balance net of pumping production), 
on the other hand, in 2016, the actual electricity produced from renewable sources contributed 
34.0%. 
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Figure 7Share of RES on GFC. Source GSE. 
While up until 2008 the trend of electricity generated by RES was mainly linked to the hydraulic 
source, in recent years the importance of "new renewables" (solar, wind and bioenergy) has 
gradually increased. 
 
Figure 8 Evolution of production from renewable sources (TWh). Source: le rinnovabili nel 2017, GSE. 
In 2016 Lombardy confirmed itself as the Italian region with the largest production from 
renewable sources: 16,330 GWh, equal to 15.1% of the 108,022 GWh produced in Italy. Two 
other regions of Northern Italy follow, namely Piedmont and Trentino Alto Adige, which 
account for 9.4% and 8.9% of production respectively national team of 2016. 
Electricity generation from renewable sources is thus distributed among macro areas: Northern 
Italy 51.8%, Central 15.8%, South (including Islands) 33.2%. 
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Taking a look at the main renewable energy source in Italy: 
2.2.1 HYDRO 
A hydroelectric plant is a complex of hydraulic works, machinery, equipment, buildings, and 
services for the transformation of hydraulic energy into electricity.  
In the transformation of the energy system towards renewables, hydropower21 is strategic to 
grasp the objectives in 2030. In Italy, with about 18.5 GW of power it represents 36% of the 
entire renewable energy plant, it produces 20% of the total electricity and even 39% of the 
renewable one.  
At the end of 2016, most of the hydroelectric plants are located in the northern regions (80.9%) 
and especially in Piedmont (820 plants), in Trentino Alto Adige (765) and in Lombardy (594). 
As a consequence, the same regions have the highest concentration of power (59.6%): the 
highest values are recorded in Lombardy (5.096 MW), Trentino Alto Adige (3,297 MW) and 
Piedmont (2,720 MW), i.e. the regions where the largest hydroelectric plants in the country are 
located. The regions of Central and South that are distinguished by the greater use of the 
hydraulic source are Abruzzo with 1,011 MW of installed power and Calabria with 771 MW. 
hydroelectric production is mainly concentrated in the regions of Northern Italy. The regions 
of Northern Italy contribute 80.8% of the total renewable hydroelectric production, the central 
ones with 7.9%, the southern ones with 11.3%. In particular, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Piedmont and Veneto cover, together, 68.2% of the total hydroelectric production of 2016.  
Meteorological factors are the main reason for the variability of hydroelectric production.  
 
Figure 9 Evolution of HYDRO production. Source: gse rapporto statistico 2016. 
The reduction in precipitation in recent years has led to a drop in hydroelectric production with 
bullish effects on the price of electricity and the import of fossil fuels from the Italian system. 
                                                 
21 Pursuant to the Community legislation, pure pumping systems are excluded because lectricity produced in 
pumping stations using water previously pumped upstream can not be considered renewable. 
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At present the sector has reached maturity and growth is possible almost exclusively for mini 
hydro, while the exploitation of the potential of large plants can only take place with an 
extensive renewal program (hampered by the Minimum Vital Wastes Directive - DMV which 
requires a minimum release of water from dams to preserve the ecosystem), the excessive 
growth of concession charges that increasingly diverges from the performance of operators' 
revenues. In the absence of adequate policies for the sector, there will be an inexorable decline.  
 
2.2.2 SOLAR 
A photovoltaic system means an installation able to obtain electricity by using sunlight. 
At the end of 2016, 732,053 photovoltaic plants were installed in Italy for a total power of 19.3 
GW. Overall, the power of photovoltaic systems represents 36.9% of that for the entire 
renewable energy plant. Although the difference in solar radiation (≈ + 20% in South than 
North), the PV plants are spread all over the country. The greatest concentration of installations 
is found in the northern regions (about 54% of the total); approximately 17% are installed in 
the Center, the remaining 29% in the South. The installed power is concentrated for 44% in the 
North, 38% in the South and 18% in Central Italy. Lombardy is the region with the highest 
number of installed plants (109.108), followed by Veneto with almost 100,000 plants. Puglia, 
on the other hand, is characterized by the greater installed power (2,623 MW), followed at a 
distance from Lombardy with 2,178 MW. 
In the course of the year the production from solar source is equal to 22.104 GWh, 20.5% of 
the total electric production from renewable sources, for the first year there was a decrease in 
production compared to the previous year, equal to -3.7%, a phenomenon most likely due 
mainly to less radiation, but other reasons are to be considered, such as the quality of some 
plants, poor maintenance and decrease in the level of support. 
 
Figure 10 Annual production of photovoltaic systems in Italy, Source: gse rapporto statistico 2016. 
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Puglia, with 3,465 GWh, is the region characterized by the increased production from 
photovoltaic plants in 2016 (15.7% of the total). Following Lombardia with 9.8% and Emilia 
Romagna with 9.5%. 
 
2.2.3 WIND 
Wind power plants are generation plants based on devices such as wind turbines able to convert 
the kinetic energy of the wind into electrical energy. 
At the end of 2016, 3,598 wind plants were installed in Italy with an installed capacity of 9,410 
MW (18% of the total national renewable energy plant). Almost all wind plants in operation 
were built in the new millennium, with a growth that has become very strong (around 1 GW 
per year) from 2007 to 2012, when around two-thirds of the power today in service (9.5 GW) 
was installed (thanks to the Green Certificates system). For the construction and operation of 
wind farms, some environmental and territorial characteristics of sites such as windiness, 
orography, accessibility are particularly important. For these reasons, in Southern Italy, 96.7% 
of the national wind power is installed and 89.1% of the plants in terms of number. The region 
with the highest installed power is Puglia, with 2,440.9 MW; follow Sicily and Campania, with 
1,795.2 MW and 1,350.6 MW respectively. 
Between 2003 and 2016, the production of electricity from wind power rose more than tenfold, 
from 1,458 GWh to 17,689 GWh.  
 
Figure 11 Evolution of WIND production.  Source: gse rapporto statistico 2016. 
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Puglia with 4,787 GWh holds the record for wind production, followed by Sicily (3,058 GWh) 
and Campania (2,562 GWh). These three regions together cover 58.9% of the national total. In 
the north, there are modest values of production, due to the limited installed power.  
 
2.3 LEVELIZED COST OF RENEWABLE ENERGY  
There are many costs in generating electricity. They include, by naming only a few, 
construction, operation, maintenance, interest, fuel, insurance and taxes. These costs are 
incurred periodically. Capital expenditures occur in the initial phase of the power plant while 
operating, maintenance and fuel costs are due continuously. To simplify the comparison 
between competing projects, the leveled cost method reduces all costs to their current equivalent 
value, regardless of when they arise. The Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) is that price which 
equals the net present value of the revenues of the power plant with the net discounted value of 
costs. The main elements that make up the total cost of a plant's entire life are its production 
capacity, capital expenditure, operating and maintenance costs, and fuel costs. 
Renewable power plants have lower values both in terms of production capacity and life-time. 
This combination gives traditional sources a great advantage in terms of LCOE because the 
reduced production of renewables reduces both the revenues and the quantity on which fixed 
costs can be spread, so the LCOE is higher. 
The energies produced from renewable sources require initial investments (and therefore 
financing costs) of much greater than traditional sources; consequently, the LCOE of the 
various renewable energies are significantly higher. 
Operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, can be divided into the two categories of variable 
and fixed costs. 
Except for bioenergy, for all renewables, the cost of fuel is close to 0. 
The 2012 Carson study used the values estimated by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. 
Analyzing the table A1 in Appendix we can see how traditional technologies with a lower 
LCOE are the CCGT, that is the combined cycle natural gas ($ 0.051 / kWh) and supercritical 
coal ($ 0.062 / kWh). On the side of the carbon-free technologies the most economical is 
advanced nuclear ($ 0.065 / kWh), but among the actual renewables the only technologies that 
are close to compete with those mentioned above are geothermal ($ 0.068 / kWh) and onshore 
wind power ($ 0.073 / kWh).  
The other element that is immediately noticeable is the different composition of the total LCOE 
between traditional and renewable technologies. In the former, the sum between O&M costs 
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and fuel costs always exceeds the capital costs, while in the latter capital expenditures far 
exceed O & M costs everywhere, with fuel costs always equal to 0. 
 
2.4 ROLE OF RENEWABLES IN THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The development of electricity produced from renewable sources has a decisive impact, in Italy 
and in other European countries, both on the operation of electrical systems and on the results 
of the energy markets.  
The renewed energy context is made more complex by the presence of some economic factors, 
such as the gradual reduction in electricity consumption, a constant increase in the contribution 
of renewable sources - especially on the distribution networks on which most photovoltaic  and 
wind plants are located - and a significant decrease in the hours of use of traditional combined 
cycle plants. In this new scenario, destined to evolve further to the advantage of renewables, 
the consequences that occur in the electricity market become interesting.  
The behavior of RES, which differs from the conventional sources, requires each country to 
adapt its energy policy. The main features of renewables are: 
 Intermittency: RE production needs priority of dispatch because it can hardly be 
foreseen and electricity generated cannot be stored. This may also lead to an increased 
need for spare peak production capacities to be available to cope with the increased 
intermittency in the grid, 
 Segmentation: most RE plants are small and widely distributed within a country, which 
requires grid reinforcement works.  
The effects of RE generation on electricity markets are still unclear and certainly dependent on 
each country’s energy mix.  
In Italy, in the sessions of the day-ahead market (MGP) organized according to the criterion of 
economic merit and with the enhancement of energy to the marginal offer, renewable sources, 
characterized by marginal production costs almost nil, displace the curve of fossil-based plants, 
thus helping to reduce the price of energy on the market. This phenomenon already studied in 
other countries and defined in the literature as "Merit Order Effect" (MOE), becomes more and 
more evident as the contribution of RES increases with respect to energy needs. 
To analyze this effect elementary concepts such as demand and supply of electricity need to be 
defined. 
As stressed in Chapter 1, the electricity market is an exchange platform aggregating supply and 
demand for electricity. 
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We consider the demand for electricity short-term and inelastic to price because consumers are 
supplied on long-term contracts. It represents the sum of all power which is transferred from 
high voltage transmission grid to the next lower level, which is the distribution grid. 
Supply for electricity consists in an energy mix which can be divided into 3 categories: 
• Baseload: such as nuclear and conventional thermal power, to sustain a constant level 
of production. It is unable to adapt to short-term variations in electricity demand. It typically 
has high fixed costs and low marginal costs;  
• Mid-load: in between such as coal or combined heat and power (“CHP”); 
• Peak load: such as gas, to adapt to high sudden demand. Units are usually smaller with 
low fixed costs and high marginal costs. These production facilities are utilized only a few hours 
per year but charge high prices because of the instantaneous shortage in supply. 
As electricity cannot be stored (except in some hydro installations, to a minor extent) there 
needs to be a perfect clearance at each time between the demand for electricity and power 
injected in the grid. The grid regulator tries to forecast demand, and different available power 
plants will adapt to this forecasted output: power plants with the lowest marginal cost will be 
tapped in first. In market environments, prices at a given time are determined by the most 
expensive power producers able to satisfy the demand (i.e. with the highest marginal costs) and 
are imposed on all other producers (since in a purely competitive market, the equilibrium 
between supply and demand is met when price equals marginal cost). 
 
Figure 12 Merit Order Curve. Source Green Giraffe energy bankers, 2013. 
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In a perfectly competitive and transparent market, it is then possible to build the relationship 
between the electricity demand at a given time and the associated price by sorting energy 
sources in growing order of marginal cost. This step function is called the merit order curve 
(“MOC”). The width of each step represents the supply capacity of an energy source while its 
height is its marginal cost. 
Electricity prices are determined by the intersection of the MOC and the short-term demand. 
The insertion of  RES in the grid changes things. Power from renewable has to be sold too. 
RES, as mentioned before, have a different behavior than the baseload, midload and peakload 
conventional sources. Increasing the supply of renewable energy tends to lower the average 
price per unit of electricity because these have very low marginal costs: they do not have to pay 
for fuel, and the sole contributors to their marginal cost are operational and maintenance. With 
cost often reduced by feed-in-tariff revenue, their electricity is as a result, less costly on the spot 
market than that from coal or natural gas, and transmission companies buy from them first.  
That means they lower the entrance price and push more expensive conventional producers 
down the merit order curve. This is defined as the MOE and displayed in the figure below. 
 
Figure 13 Electricity price fluctuation due to the Merit Order Effect. Source  www.cleanenergy wire.org, 2015. 
 
The market clearing power plant receives its marginal cost, while for the other plants the 
clearing price is higher than their running cost. The difference between the clearing price and 
the marginal cost is known as the inframarginal rent. Inframarginal rents are needed to recover 
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fixed generation costs. Only if the market clearing price is higher than the sum of the marginal 
and fixed cost for most of the time, the technology will be attractive for investors 
A study by eLeMens 2013 states how the growing role of RES affects margins’ rate that the 
various sources and technologies have on the market during the day. Combined Cycles (CCGT) 
continue to maintain marginal technology supremacy and take advantage of the nightly peak of 
Demand, less influenced by RES with particular reference to photovoltaics, where CCGT plants 
form the price from 60% to 70% of the time, increasing prices to implement the so-called "night 
recovery": in particular, when the marginality of the CCGTs is higher at 60%, the average 
hourly PUN is above the 24-hour PUN average. However, when the price falls below € 
50/MWh CCGT technology loses its record: coal (including also oil-coal plants) becomes the 
main source in terms of marginality for prices between 30 and 50 €/MWh, while with prices 
below 30 €/MWh it is the imported energy that determines the price as a marginal source for 
more hours than other technologies and sources. 
If we define capital intensity the ratio between capital necessary for production and running 
costs, typically base-midload plants (coal and nuclear) and renewable source plants (excluding 
biomass) are characterized by a high capital intensity index. The imbalance towards the capital-
intensive production of the national generation mix raises important questions about its 
adequacy in relation to the needs of the electricity sector. In a possible scenario of stagnant 
energy demand and further growth, albeit at much lower rates, of variable renewable sources, 
the general level of electricity market prices could fall further. However, this would result in an 
increasingly compressed role of the combined cycles causing a situation of simultaneous 
absence of signals for the development of new investments and scarcity of resources for the 
maintenance of system security. So they seem to change the new requirements of the electricity 
market: from the need for "energy" to the need for "capacity" available and ready to intervene 
to maintain system security. For this reason, capacity payment mechanisms appear to be 
increasingly important in the guidelines of the Regulator because it lowers the investment risk 
in generation capacity. 
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Chapter 3 
THE MERIT ORDER EFFECT IN THE 
MARKET 
In Italy, like in many other countries, the liberalization has lead to the creation of energy-only 
markets i.e energy generators receive revenues for selling electricity but not for providing 
capacities. This kind of markets can experience investments below than their optimal level 
(creating a sort of “missing money problem”, i.e. when prices do not fully reflect scarcity in 
tight market conditions, reducing profitability and leading to underinvestment in capacity over 
the longer haul) due to markets imperfections and inadequate regulations. Issues include limited 
demand-side flexibility, inadequate spot prices during scarcity events due to regulatory price 
limits, investment risks due to volatile prices and coordination failures (Cramton and Ockenfels, 
2012; Edenhofer et al., 2013). 
While an increase in RES does not lead by itself to a failure of energy only markets, the rise in 
RES share, especially VRE share, worse these markets failure in two ways. First, higher 
renewable shares lead to lower average prices. While a low average price is advantageous from 
the consumer perspective, over the long run, this MOE,  affects investment incentives of fossil-
fuel generators, which are in the medium term needed to provide firmness and flexibility to the 
system, thus potentially undermining the security of supply. From the viewpoint of 
conventional generators, the “merit order effect” exacerbates the problem of missing money. 
More RES can also weaken the role of forward contracting in alleviating market power in 
wholesale electricity markets and lead to higher prices in situations where the RES capacity 
factor is low. Second, VRE increases price volatility and thus investors might be discouraged 
or require higher risk premiums.  
As consequence reserve margins shrink and scarcity events occur more frequently. In addition, 
the revenues from renewables decline at rising shares of VRE if other factors are kept constant. 
Nevertheless, renewables are supported in many countries due to their expected beneficial 
effects such as emission reduction or employment creation (Groba and Breitschopf, 2013). A 
variety of support schemes is employed for increasing electricity generation from renewables 
(Ragwitz and Steinhilber, 2014). These differ regarding the degree to which plant operators are 
affected by market prices. 
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However, promoting renewables could lead to a paradox in that successful penetration of 
renewables could fall victim to its own success. With the current market architecture, future 
deployment of renewable energy will then necessarily be more costly and less scalable.  
In this chapter, we will analyze this three possible issues that can arise from a too much injection 
of renewables in the market system. 
 
3.1 MARKETABILITY OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
For the renewables, the merit-order effect leads to a lower income from electricity markets. 
Electricity systems with limited intertemporal flexibility and a high share of VRE penetration 
could induce the MOE not only to reduce the electricity price but also the MWh value of VRE. 
Variable renewables are disproportionally affected by the lower market prices as their 
generation often occurs in hours with low prices. A more metaphorical description for declining 
VRE market revenues with an increasing share is the term ‘cannibalism effect’.  
Private investments in VRE technologies seem to be profitable if their LCOE is below the 
specific individual retail electricity price. This concept, which however ignores important 
economic facts, is called ‘grid parity’. Based on this consideration, the concept of 
‘marketability’ is defined: a generation technology is marketable if the average revenues on 
competitive wholesale electricity markets during its lifetime are high enough to cover its 
average total generation costs, the LCOE, without recourse to regulatory remuneration 
schemes. In the case of VRE, this would mean that an investment in VRE would be profitable 
even if there were not any regulatory mechanisms (Zipp, 2017). 
 
Figure 14 Evolution of the source market price. Source GSE 2017,  Il valore dell’energia rinnovabile sul mercato elettrico. 
Evidence from GSE shows how the drop in electricity market prices verified in recent years has 
been even more pronounced for VRE valued in recent years at prices lower than the PUN: the 
wind and PV market price in the last few years has had a negative spread compared to the PUN 
between 2 and 6 € / MWh; the geographical concentration and the simultaneity of the wind and 
PV productions create high supply conditions that drastically reduced marginal prices.  
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The development of the average market revenues for wind and PV plants is of crucial 
importance for reaching their marketability. If the revenues keep declining with the expansion 
of VRE generation, the LCOE will need to decline faster. Typically, fixed costs make up a large 
part of the LCOE of VRE technologies, which require no fuels and therefore have small variable 
costs22. Price indices for the elementary cost components of PV and wind plants reflect a 
considerable decline of the LCOE of VRE generation in the past but there is still a large 
potential for further cost depression.  Further solutions must to be taken into account such as 
the market conditions and the regulatory framework which should be adapted to the intended 
future electricity system with a high share of VRE. Possibilities for decreasing the specific merit 
order- effect while increasing the market revenues for VRE technologies may be interesting 
topics for future research in the field of power system design. First promising approaches are 
strengthening the emission allowances price signal23 (Koch N. et al, 2014), reducing subsidies 
to non-renewable energy sources24(Lehmann P., Gawel E., 2013), improving the flexibility of 
thermal generators, the electricity storage capacity and the short-term price elasticity of demand 
as well as adapting the trading conditions and products and incentivizing system friendly 
renewables. If these, or other measures, prove not to be sufficient for increasing the average 
VRE revenues, or at least lowering their decline rate, further research in the design of long-term 
remuneration schemes for VRE electricity generation should be undertaken. Researchers, as 
well as policy makers, should take the possibility of a limited role for solar and wind power 
into account and should not disregard other greenhouse gas mitigation options too early. 
 
3.2 IMPACT OF SUPPORT SCHEMES ON PRICES 
Renewables are supported in many countries due to their expected benefits. For governments, 
it is often a struggle to produce a renewable policy that achieves all its objectives because they 
usually compete against each other. The success of any renewable policy as such can be 
measured through three parameters: 
                                                 
22 The module cost are responsible for about half of the investment cost of small scale PV plants, in case of larger 
PV plants the cost share can be even higher.  In case of wind power plants, the turbine is the highest cost component 
with a share of about 75%  of the investment cost. 
23 The price for EU Allowances (EUAs) went from 28€ per ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2) in mid-2008 to 5€/tCO2 
in 2013. The widely-held view among market participants, academics and policy-makers  is that three main causes 
can be put forward to explain the weak EUA price signal: (i) the deep and lasting economic crisis in the European 
Union, , (ii) the overlapping climate policies, e.g. feed-in tariffs for renewables  and (iii) the large influx of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) in the EU ETS. The coexistence of EU ETS 
and RES deployment targets, however, creates a classic case of interaction effects. Theoretical work suggests that 
the overlapping policies work at cross-purposes, since RES injections displace CO2 emissions within the EU ETS 
and thereby reduce the EUA demand and price. 
24 The use of non-renewable energy technologies has also been promoted by enormous direct subsidies. These 
subsidies reduce the cost of non-renewable energy sources and make them inefficiently cheap. The first-best 
solution would be to abolish the subsidies. 
34 
 
1) Total cost per MWh 
2) Amount of renewable deployed over the lifetime of the policy 
3) The speed at which the renewables are adopted 
Renewable policies cannot achieve all three objectives at the same time. There are trade-offs 
between the cost of a policy, the speed of adoption and total deployment. 
The kind of support instrument can, however, influence the degree to which renewables 
influence the market. The support scheme influences both the trading behavior and the plant 
design by the degree to which plants are dependent on price developments and thus demand 
conditions on regular electricity markets (Jägemann, C., 2014). 
FIT ( feed-in tariffs) consists of a fixed tariff that is paid to the plant operators for each unit of 
electricity they produce independently of the demand situation of the electricity system. Thus, 
neither investments decisions nor short-term generation patterns are adapted to the demand 
situation. It grants constant payment per unit of electricity generated and entails low risk for 
plant operators and low capital cost. The height of FIT should correspond to the LCOE and so 
should adequately compensate VRE investors and producers. However, government need a lot 
of information to set the FIT at the right height otherwise there is a risk of over/under 
compensation. The existence of FIT generally also contributes to a more continuous and stable 
RES market development. FIT provides an incentive to maximize the production of RES 
electricity because they are output-based. In many countries, they have proven their ability to 
stimulate rapid and large-scale RES market development as well as the development of less 
mature RES technologies and the participation of small and medium scale RES electricity 
producers. In Italy the main feed-in tariff is represented by the Tariffa Omnicomprensiva (TO), 
which supports small RES installation excluding PV. The tariff both includes the incentive and 
the value of electricity feed into the power grid.  
The FIP (feed-in premium) is defined as a fixed amount, on top of the electricity market price, 
for each MWh generated. FIP can either be fixed (i.e. at a constant level independent of market 
prices) or sliding (i.e. with variable levels depending on the evolution of market prices). This 
amount moves in parallel with electricity prices. Plant operators sell their electricity on the 
market and are therefore incentivized to react to market signals i.e. to produce electricity when 
demand is high and/or production from other energy sources is low. Plant operators face 
opportunity costs equal to the premium payment when they reduce their output due to market 
conditions.  In Italy, we have the Conto Energia (CE) for solar energy production. Almost all 
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of the success of PV production in Italy derived from this incentive which is one of the highest 
in Europe and consequently the most costly25. 
For quota schemes, the opportunity costs are determined on the certificates markets. The main 
advantage of RES quota and certificate systems is that RES policy targets can be achieved in a 
very cost-efficient way because the certificate prices are determined by market forces. Utilities 
that have to fulfill a RES quota have a strong incentive of doing this in the most cost-efficient 
way possible. This minimizes the overall costs of the support scheme for electricity consumers.  
In Italy, we have the Certificati Verdi26(CV) which is a tradable asset granted by the GSE27 at 
the request of the RES producers in proportion to the energy produced. One CV corresponds to 
1MWh of electricity produced. Each operator producing or importing more the 100 GWh of 
electricity from conventional sources, must satisfy the RES obligation: it must produce or 
introduce in the following year a quantity of RE equal to the defined quota (2%) of energy 
produced or imported exceeding the threshold the previous year. The power producers can meet 
the quota either producing the RE obligation by their own or by purchasing CVs. RES producers 
can accumulate the CVs and sell them at higher prices in case of high demand or resell them to 
GSE at a buy back price. The drawback of this incentive is represented by the high risk for plant 
operators due to double marketing on electricity and certificates markets. 
Capacity based support scheme is the market mechanism that rewards the most flexible plants, 
also for the power they make available rather than just for production. It enables undistorted 
market participation as the support is paid independently from generation. It is however 
extremely challenging to design such a scheme without reducing the incentives for plant output 
maximization resulting from undesirable plant designs. Furthermore, depending on the concrete 
support scheme design the incentive for generating renewable electricity under a capacity-based 
support scheme is reduced. Thus reaching generation based targets might imply the need for 
higher installed capacity and therefore potentially higher policy costs. In Italy, AEEG started a 
capacity market in 2017 where producers have to guarantee the availability of electricity 
production capacity that protects the system from the risk of generation deficits or critical 
situations. The quantities of capacity to be made available will be determined by the grid 
operator on the basis of expected consumption and reserve requirements, also taking into 
account the effects of energy efficiency measures and production from renewable sources. 
                                                 
25 As a result of the last amendment in 2012, the has been a restructuring of the entire CE system and the legislator 
decidedand the legislator decided that the scheme ceases to provide incentives to new capacity once the cumulative 
cost of incentive reaches the level of 6.7 billion euros per year like happened in july 2013. 
26 It substituted in 2001 the CIP6 which was a FIT scheme with a guaranteed price for 15 years. GSE purchase 
RES at the guaranteed price and sell it into the market at the market price. 
27 State owned company responsible for implementing the policy aimed at promoting RE in Italy 
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The choice of the support scheme impacts the degree to which the merit order effect takes places 
as it changes the bidding behavior of renewables. 
 
Figure 15 MOE under different support schemes for a situation with low demand and high renewable generation. Source 
Winkler J. et al 2016.  
Differences between support schemes are only significant in situations with low demand. 
Under FIT scheme with priority dispatch of renewable sources all renewable electricity is put 
into the market independently of occurring costs and generation is maximized at all times 
independently of demand situation. 
A FIP or quota scheme reduces the MOE slightly as the reduction of electricity output becomes 
an economic option at very low electricity prices and variable generation costs become relevant 
for electricity output. Under a capacity based support scheme renewables bid at marginal costs 
which means that plants are only dispatched if the variable costs are below those of other 
possible conventional plants. Renewable plants with substantial variable costs are affected more 
heavily by changes in the support system. However, the change to support systems with a higher 
degree of market participation for renewable with very low marginal cost avoids extremely low 
prices and thus also leads to higher average electricity prices.  
Some electricity markets allow for negative electricity prices. These occur if inflexible 
conventional plants, e.g. those contracted in balancing markets, needs to stay online in times of 
low residual demand and therefore accept to pay for generating electricity. Price volatility is 
influenced by different support scheme mainly due to the extent of negative prices. Under the 
capacity based-support scheme, renewables bid at zero or positive prices and thus negative 
prices occur very rarely. Under feed-in premiums and quota schemes, negative prices are less 
extreme than under feed-in tariff schemes as renewable generators rather reduce output than 
accepting very negative prices. Therefore price volatility is expected to be highest under feed-
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in tariffs and lowest under capacity based schemes or without support given a certain installed 
renewable capacity. 
In general, we conclude that capacity based support scheme, which is generation independent, 
reduce the impact of renewables on electricity prices particularly in systems with high must run 
requirements. When choosing the appropriate instrument for supporting renewables not only 
the degree of market distortion needs to be considered. More market-oriented support schemes 
are generally riskier and can result in higher support costs. Also, designing capacity based 
support schemes that do not result in reducing electricity generation and perverse incentives 
regarding the plant design is very challenging. Furthermore, market-based reduction of 
electricity generation from renewables is higher under the capacity based support schemes 
especially if system flexibility is low. For these reasons sliding feed-in premiums might be a 
good compromise between a certain degree of market participation and comparably low risks 
for plant operators (Winkler et al. 2016). 
 
3.3 IMPACT OF RENEWABLES ON THE LIBERALIZED 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
Till now we know that the more the penetration of renewables the larger the shift in merit order 
curve (and consequently greater the merit order effect on price) and the increase in the price 
volatility.  
Although, renewables with their minor marginal cost of dispatch, could fall victim to their own 
success after capturing a large share in the liberalized power market.  With the existing 
liberalized market structure, future stationing of renewables could be more costly and less 
scalable due to the impact on electricity prices. This somehow means that a too rewarding 
renewables policy and incentives could reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of such future 
measures. 
To understand this intuition, we need to clarify the relationship between liberalized market and 
promotion of renewables and their compatibility.  
Liberalization has been advocated and implemented precisely with the aim to increase 
efficiency, avoiding the monopolist distortion and letting market competition to rule and to 
increase transparency, disposing of the opaque cross-subsidization mechanism implicit in the 
management of the vertically integrated monopolist. 
The liberalized structure of the market is based on two assumptions: 
1) Positive marginal costs 
2) Dispachability of power. 
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Neither of these two assumptions is applicable to renewable energy as they are largely 
intermittent, non-programmable and have almost zero marginal costs. 
In this circumstances, incentive schemes become more expensive and lead to less deployment. 
There is a sort of paradox which originates from the market design and the renewables policies 
and that leads to less successful outcomes the more the share of renewables increase in the 
energy mix.  
From the market’s perspective, this paradox is the outcome of several elements: 
• The (almost) zero marginal cost of renewables which explains the main reason for the 
priority in the order of dispatch. Although renewable technologies are often not the cheapest in 
terms of total cost. This leads to a divergence between the true cost of the system (what end 
consumers pay) and the evolution of the price of electricity in the wholesale market  
• The intermittent nature of renewables 
• The interplay between price volatility and renewable technologies. Price volatility is an 
inherent characteristic of electricity markets due to the lack of reliable and meaningful storage. 
Thus the presence of any non-dispatchable generator would force conventional thermal power 
producers to make sudden adjustments to their production which leads to sharp changes in 
electricity prices. Now, this volatility is worsened by the presence of unpredictable and 
intermittent technology. 
Falling and more volatile electricity prices are certainly not ingredients for the long-term growth 
of renewable technologies unless costs are declining more quickly than the combination of 
market price drops and financing cost hikes. 
Moving to a policy side perspective we start from two simplistic assumptions: i) we assume the 
goal of a renewable energy policy is to deploy renewable capacity at the lowest cost possible 
and ii) and we assume it already exists a critical mass of renewable energy in place that distorts 
the standard price formation in the liberalized markets. This means accommodating a small 
quantity of renewables in the system can be achieved without distorting prices, profits or 
incentives for investments. 
Our point is that implementing incentives in the market with decreasing but volatile prices can 
lead to less deployment than the initial expectation or to more expensive policy support 
(Blazquez et al 2016).  
In fact, investing in new renewable capacity is less attractive in a time of lower electricity prices, 
as they reduce expected profits and also private investors are likely to demand higher rates of 
return as the volatility raises the uncertainties over their projects (Gross et al. 2010). The 
combination of these two factors, lower expected profits and higher profits requirements, will 
reduce the number of projects commisioned in the absence of additional policy support. The 
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level of feed-in premium, for example, will need to be higher than otherwise in order to maintain 
a given level of investments. 
Feed-in tariff could be a potential way to deal with this problem since by fixing price it 
guarantees a stable flow of revenues. However, this instrument would lead to an increasing 
level of support as wholesale prices decline due to the penetration of new renewable capacity. 
Taxpayers (through government) or consumers (through a surcharge on their bills) would need 
to compensate generators to better cover the difference between fixed and spot prices in the 
market. In the short term, consumers may benefit from the decline in electricity prices, while 
the equity value of incumbent generators may deteriorate. 
In longer-term investors will not reinvest o recapitalize electricity markets without sufficient 
guarantees on return. This additional cost will be born by taxpayers or consumers. In Italy, the 
sustainability promotion activities managed by the GSE have resulted in a total investment of 
16.1 billion euro (about 1% of national GDP) over the last year, financed through the energy 
bills of companies and families.  
A power sector which relies on 100 percent of renewables is not sustainable given the current 
design of the market as conventional technologies provide important price signals. There is a 
cap to the capability of the decentralized market to deliver with transparency the proper market 
signals. In fact, in the case of full decarbonization, prices would be at renewable marginal cost 
i.e. equal to zero for long periods. These prices would not be capturing the system’s cost nor 
would they be useful to signal operation and investments decisions. Thus, non dispatchable 
technologies need to coexist with fossil fuels technologies. 
New market mechanism needs to be designed, based on two main pillars. First, it is necessary 
to reform the market in order to capture the full renewable cost structure. Second, it is necessary 
to more accurately compensate for conventional technologies. This is crucial to convey the 
correct market signal to new investors in both technologies: on the one side, renewable investors 
need to know the social value of renewable generation for environmental goals and, on the other 
side, conventional sources investors need to know the correct value of their contribution to 
security and reliability system management (Blazquez et al, 2018). 
 
In the next chapter, we will empirically compute the effect of renewable energy sources in the 
Italian wholesale day ahead electricity prices and the measure the effects also on the electricity 
price volatility. Investors future investment decisions, the risk premium on projects and further 
policy implication can be based on the empirical results of the following analysis. 
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Chapter 4 
MODEL 
 
The electricity production from renewable energy sources (RES) has increased in most 
European member states over the past 10-15 years. The investment incentive for RES is mainly 
driven by policy support measures such as feed-in tariffs, which guarantee a fixed price per unit 
of renewable electricity generated, while other generators must sell their electricity in a spot 
market. However, the influence of RES on electricity spot market prices is growing with the 
increasing share of renewable electricity deployed. This is due to the how spot prices are 
determined as a function of supply and demand. The supply curve, the so-called merit order, is 
derived by ordering the supplier bids according to ascending marginal cost. The intersection of 
the demand curve with the merit-order defines the market clearing price i.e. the electricity spot 
market price. The feed-in of renewable energy sources with low or near zero marginal cost 
results in a shift to the right of the merit-order. This shift moves the intersection of the demand 
curve and the merit order to a lower marginal price level and thus the electricity price on the 
spot market is reduced. This reduction in price is called the merit-order effect.  
 
4.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a considerable literature on this issue now, so it is possible to take stock and draw some 
general conclusions. However, this is not an easy endeavor because the measurement of price 
effects depends on several diverging factors contemplated in the different studies (technological 
mix in the electricity system, market conditions etc.). 
We can group the existing literature in 2 categories: 
1) simulation based approach which employs real/past or hypothetical data, 
2) the empirical analysis which use real, past data to create econometric models. 
While simulation is often used for welfare evaluation of  renewable support policy by 
comparing simulated price in hypothetical nonrenewable scenarios with empirical price data, 
regression analysis are used for the estimation of MOE with a straight focus on the price and 
distributional effects. Using an electricity market model requires careful calibration and 
especially the definition of a reasonable counterfactual scenario. Regression analysis, on the 
other hand, can employ actual historical data and does not have to make assumptions about 
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alternative developments. At the same time, only rather short-term merit order effects, based 
on the current electricity market and power generation structure are calculated. Moreover, 
issues such as the costs for new power plants or network development are not considered. 
4.1.1 SIMULATION-BASED STUDIES 
This approach has been applied to a number of countries and regions to explain the effects of 
renewables on electricity prices.  
Starting with Germany, Sensfuss et al. (2008) use a model of the electricity market to run 
several simulations for situations with and without renewable production. They find that the 
average electricity price for Germany was reduced by 1.7 to 7.8 €/MWh due to the electricity 
production of renewables for the years 2001 and 2004 to 2006. In a subsequent application, 
Sensfuss (2011) uses the same technique for the 2007-2010 period, showing that the 2010 effect 
is found to be at least (i.e. in a conservative calculation) between 5 and 6 €/MWh. In a 
subsequent exercise, Weigt (2009) models the German electricity market to investigate the 
potential of wind generation to replace traditional fossil capacities. While doing so, he 
calculates electricity prices for the scenarios with and without wind generation and finds lower 
prices for the former between January 2006 and June 2008. The price effect of wind generation 
also grows over time. The study reports an average price effect of approximately -10 €/MWh 
for the studied period. With a somewhat different approximation, Fürsch et al. (2012) model 
are capable of reflecting international cross-border flows and also allows for a changing 
electricity mix as a response to growing renewable participation in the mix. The results are 
forecasts for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 that compare a scenario of the German energy market 
with a counterfactual of frozen renewable capacity at 2010 levels. 
There are also some simulation studies on this question for Spain, another leading European 
supporter for renewables. Linares et al. (2008) use a simulation model of the electricity market 
to obtain results, up to 2020, for different scenarios: with and without a European carbon 
emission scheme and with or without additional national renewable support (or both). Given 
the actual existence of the EU ETS, that scenario may be used as counterfactual for the 
alternative situation where additional renewable support results in an expanded renewable 
capacity of 21.81 TWh in 2020. As a consequence, electricity prices would decrease by 1.74 
€/MWh. In another simulation analysis, Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008) show that WIND energy 
input significantly reduced Spanish electricity prices between 2005 and 2007 (amounts vary 
from -7.08 €/MWh to -12.44 €/MWh between the periods). 
Lastly, Holttinen et al. (2001) carry out a simulation study for Nordpol (the Nordic electricity 
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market that comprises Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) to estimate the impact of 
WIND 
generation on market prices. Using wind data from 1961 to 1990 to calibrate the model, in a 
2010 forecast scenario the model yields spot price reductions of 2 €/MWh for every 10 TWh of 
additional wind production in the space of one week.  
4.1.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Actual price effect of expanding renewables are computed through different econometric 
approaches and techniques taken advantage of the growing availability of ex-post data on 
electricity prices and renewable capacity in several countries. 
Starting again with Germany, although with very limited empirical evidence (that justifies 
carrying out our ad-hoc exercise later in the paper), Neubarth et al. (2006) set up a univariate 
regression model to investigate the effect of wind power production on day-ahead spot prices 
in Germany from September 2004 to August 2005. They find that the day-ahead electricity 
price falls by 1.89 €/MWh for each additional GW of wind production. 
Gelabert et al. (2011) use daily production quantities of different electricity generation types 
for Spain to investigate how they affect electricity prices during the 2005-2009 period. They 
find that each GW of additional renewable electricity production reduced Spanish electricity 
prices by roughly 2 €/MWh. A similar result was obtained by Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008), after 
picking three arbitrary days of February 2006 to perform an exhaustive comparison of 
electricity prices and wind energy production. They actually follow this approach to produce a 
ceteris paribus situation for all other influences except wind input, such as electricity demand, 
fuel prices, hydro production, etc. 
Nieuwenhout and Brand (2011) use wind and weather data from the Netherlands to reconstruct 
day-ahead wind generation figures for 2006-2009 and divide the data to create groups that 
correspond to low or no-wind production intervals. They find that average day-ahead prices at 
the Dutch electricity exchange were roughly 5% higher during the no-wind intervals with 
respect to the average of the entire sample for the analyzed period. 
The effect of wind production on electricity prices has been heavily investigated in Texas due 
to the increasing relevance of renewables there Two of the first exercises use high-frequency 
data (hourly and 15 min intervals, respectively), which in Nicholson et al. (2010) are used to 
analyze the 2007-2009 period with explanatory variables that include wind generation, 
production from gas plants, temperature, and past values of the electricity price. They find a 
range of decreasing effects of wind generation on balancing electricity prices of 0.67 to 16.4 
US$/MWh per additional GW of wind production (depending on the year, time of the day, and 
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the area in the Texas network). Woo et al. (2011) study the 2007-2010 with a similar 
approximation, that includes nuclear generation, system load, price of gas, and a set of time 
dummies as additional explanatory variables, and finds that a 1 GWh increase in wind 
generation (during 15 minutes) decreased Texas balancing electricity prices between 13 and 44 
US$/MWh9. 
 
Unfortunately, these studies have not contemplated two important features of the effect of 
renewables on electricity prices. First, that this effect should just be temporary: when the 
decrease in electricity prices takes place, it reduces the long-term signal for investment and thus 
deters future investments, bringing about a subsequent increase in electricity prices due to 
restricted supply. In addition, when traditional producers may exert market power, they may 
bid higher in order to maintain the price level. These two elements are difficult to predict in 
theoretical analyses, where many assumptions have to be made about these issues. Hence, the 
actual relevance of these features may only be revealed through the analysis of real markets.  
4.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
It is particularly interesting to see how these results related to the Italian market, which also 
features an important scheme for renewable support. Our analysis tries to close the research gap 
due to the shortage of studies of the merit order effect in the Italian market. 
Italy has experienced a massive growth of installed RES capacity over the past years. It is thus 
possible to measure the MOE behavior with respect to the RES penetration rate. The Italian 
electricity market is considered as efficient (overall prices reflected through electricity market 
mechanisms) and shows a diverse energy mix which leads to a MOC that is easily extractable 
and most importantly invariant. 
In our application, we carry out a full ex-post empirical analysis, by looking at use of 
technologies and weekly hourly prices between 2012 and 2018 to provide a more general 
understanding of the actual effect of the introduction of renewable sources of energy on the 
Italian wholesale electricity prices. We believe that it is particularly interesting to perform this 
empirical study in Italy where electricity pricing is currently at the center of intense social and 
regulatory debate.  
We will use an empirical approach consisting in a multivariate regression similar to Gelabert et 
al. (2011) and Winkler et al (2016) to estimate the average effect of RES on the electricity prices 
in Italy. 
Our analysis will go through two stages: 
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1) We will estimate the impact of the variation in the production of renewable energy 
sources on the changes in the Italian electricity price. Consequently, we will use the 
Single National Price (PUN) 
2) We will re-estimate the same model in the previous stage using as dependent variable 
the zonal price taken from each geographical zone. We know from chapter 1 that in the 
formation of the electricity prices, in case of violation in the transmission constraints 
the market is split into two areas, one in import and the other in export. The result is a 
different zonal equilibrium price (Pz) in the two market zones. Power-generating 
companies receive the zonal prices, whereas buyers pay the Prezzo Unico Nazionale 
(PUN). GME uses a simplified representation of the network, which only shows the 
most relevant transit limits, or the transit limits between the national geographical areas, 
the foreign areas and the limited production poles. We will then consider only the 
national geographical areas: North, Center North, Center South, South, Sardinia, and 
Sicily. Then only to improve the refinement of the results obtained in this we’ll 
implement a panel model that will take into account the 6 zones in order to estimate a 
more precise impact of the increase in RES share on the zonal electricity prices. 
We will use weekly data from the day-ahead market for the last 6 years (from week 19 of 2012 
to week 26 of 2018), for a total of 321 weekly observations.  
Our dependent variable will be the average weekly hourly price of electricity.  
To model the average weekly electricity price, we will use as independent variables the weekly 
electricity demand (TOTEM) composed as the sum of the total volumes purchased and 
unpurchased on the day-ahead market. Then we will consider the volumes sold by renewable 
energy source in the same market, in particular, we’ll take into account the average weekly28 
volume sold of hydro (HYDRO), eolic (WIND) and solar (PV). The last two would also be 
labeled in our analysis like as variable renewable energy source (VRE29) characterized by a 
variable production dependent on the availability of the main natural power resource , very low 
marginal costs and large fixed costs. Although hydro generation is also a renewable energy 
source we do not incorporate it in the VRE because of the use of water, which can be stored 
and therefore shifted in time to profit from higher prices and has a positive opportunity cost.  
Finally, we include the price of fossil fuels, which have an impact on the price of electricity. 
We opt for the price of gas because it improves the explanatory power of our model and it 
results significantly. 
                                                 
28 Hourly weekly averages computed as the sum of the daily average prices/quantities of the week, divided by 7. 
29 In our analysis VRE is the sum of wind, pv, geothermal and a small quantities of other res sources. 
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These variables are exogenous because the demand for electricity is inelastic, while the volumes 
sold by the various renewable sources, especially those that are not programmable, depend on 
external factors such as atmospheric conditions and are fully brought to the market because of 
priority feed-in. 
The other traditional sources (gas, coal and other fossil fuels) have not been included because 
they create endogeneity and are often not significant in the model. 
 
variable explanation source 
𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬30
𝒘
 Weekly hourly (zonal) electricity price 
(€/MWh) 
Gestore dei Mercati elettrici (GME) 
𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒘 Hourly average sold from WIND during 
week w (GWh) 
“ 
𝑷𝑽𝒘 Hourly average volume sold from solar 
during week w (GWh) 
“ 
𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒘 Hourly average volume sold from HYDRO 
during week w (GWh) 
“ 
𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒘 Hourly average volume sold from RE
31 of 
the average demand of the week w. (GWh) 
“ 
𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒘 Hourly average electricity demand of the 
week w. (GWh) 
“ 
𝑷𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒘 Average gas price during week w 
(€/MWh) 
Thomson Reuters: nat. gas PSV Italia 
1st position 
Table 6 Data Description. 
4.2.1 STAGE 1: ESTIMATION OF THE MOE IN  NATIONAL SYSTEM 
USING PUN 
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us have a look at the evolution of our variables. 
                                                 
30 For the national level: average of Zonal Prices in the Day-Ahead Market, weighted for total purchases and net 
of purchases for Pumped-Storage Units and of purchases by Neighbouring Countries’ Zones. 
31 Sum of wind, solar, bioenergy and geothermal. 
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Figure 16  Evolution of PUN, PSV Italia. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson reuters ’s data. 
 
The price that we’ll consider in our analysis is the baseload-price, that is the average of the on-
peak and off-peak price32.  
Starting in 2008, a period of the recession began with a 
consequent reduction in consumption and this was also 
reflected in the price of wholesale energy, with the 
exception of the two-year period 2011-2012 in which 
there was a slight recovery (initial part of the graph). 
In the following years, the decrease in the price of 
electricity is always due to the decline in electricity 
consumption but also to the increase in renewable 
sources, which produce energy at lower costs than 
conventional power plants.  
As shown in the bar plot, after 2012, the price has always been lower in recent years, with the 
exception of 2017. The causes of the decline are in the economic situation of the country and 
in the poor recovery of the most energy-intensive sectors. In 2016, the lowest annual average 
value of the year was recorded, equal to approximately € 42 €/MWh, with a historic weekly 
                                                 
32 we have the so-called “on-peak price” that coincides in working days only, the hours from 08:00 to 20:00, i.e. 
the applicable periods from 9 to 20; and the “off-peak price” defined as all the hours of non-working days 
(holidays); on working days, the hours from 00:00 to 08:00 and from 20:00 to 24:00, i.e. the applicable periods 
from 1 to 8 and from 21 to 24. 
Figure 17  Source GME statistiche 2017. 
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minimum in 18th April 2016 with 30,4 €/MWh (the monthly average was € 31.99 €/MWh). 
Only in the second half of the year, 2016 prices started to grow again. 
In January 2017 there was a sharp rise in the PUN due mainly to the blocking of nuclear power 
plants in France33, from which Italy imports energy, the low production from hydroelectric 
power and the winter temperatures that raised the price of methane gas.  
The 2017 PUN values were nevertheless higher than the year before, re-aligning with the values 
of the two-year period 2014-2015. 
 
Our electrical system is still largely based on the use of fossil fuels so it is normal that 
changes in the price of these probably affects the price of electricity. Typically, the price of 
other energy goods is another valuable price indicator for electricity. Considering the price of 
natural gas, from fig. 16 we can see how the price of the PSV34 fell in 2009 (from € 29 to € 
18.4 / MWh) and then stabilized around € 28 €/ MWh in the following years until 2014. 
Afterward, the price of gas has decreased, even in the main international hubs, following the 
trend registered worldwide (the United States and Asia). In Italy, the average price of the PSV 
in 2015 was € 22.2 €/ MWh, decreasing by 5% compared to 2014. In contrast to what was 
recorded in 2016, which saw spot prices down on 2015, 2017 closed with average spot prices 
in the main European hubs, with spot prices at the Italian PSV rising by 25%. This trend 
contributed, in conjunction with other factors, to the rise in electricity prices. The beginning 
of 2017 was characterized by the presence of a rigid climate - which increased the demand for 
gas for heating systems - and by the reduction of electricity exports from France, which led to 
greater use of combined cycle production. The upward trend continued during the current 
year. The price of gas naturally has seasonal fluctuations based on consumption. The gas 
demand is higher during the winter period due to the heating of the houses and decreases with 
the arrival of the hot season in the summer. At the end of our analysis period, PSV recorded a 
substantial growth on an annual basis (+5 € /MWh, + 28.4%), reaching 23.38 € / MWh, at the 
highest level since 2014 for the summer months April-September. 
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables for each of the five full years in our 
analysis. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics for the whole analysis period. The weekly 
average electricity price declined constantly reaching its minimum in 2016, with a partial 
                                                 
33 At the end of September 2016, the Autorité de Sureté Nucléaire (ASN) ordered the precautionary suspension of 
18 nuclear power plants for suspicions of excessive carbon content in steel enclosures 
34 The index relating to the prices of the Italian gas spot market is called PSV (Punto di Scambio Virtuale). It is 
not a real exchange with a central counterparty and with transparent price formation mechanisms, but it is an 
exchange platform managed by GME where the supply and demand of the operators meet. The prices expressed 
by the index are those referring to the physical delivery of the gas at the national trading point. 
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recovery in 2017. This decline can be traced back to multiple factors, including the reduction 
of the weekly average demand for electricity and the reduction in the price of some 
commodities, e.g. gas (and coal). Hydroelectric generation has declined through the years; PV 
after the peak in 2014 faced a two years decrease and recovered in 2017 and finally WIND 
alternate years of increase and decrease in production.  
N=52 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
PRICE 62.94 5.31 52.17 6.82 52.63 7.34 42.18 9.15 53.84 10.71 
TOTDEM 37.63 2.39 36.19 2.61 34.81 2.73 34.25 2.34 33.97 2.51 
HYDRO 5.17 1.41 5.75 1.23 4.93 1.18 4.84 1.46 4.33 1.20 
PV 3.05 1.02 3.42 0.91 3.08 0.71 2.82 0.76 2.95 0.91 
WIND 1.62 0.67 1.67 0.60 1.5 0.63 1.61 0.77 1.58 0.8 
PGAS 27.8 1.11 23.51 3.25 21.93 1.69 15.82 2.07 19.28 1.93 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for the years 2013-2017. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters's  data 
N=321 MEAN ST.DEV. MAX MIN 
PRICE 55.12 11.81 90.7 30.5 
TOTDEM 35.50 35.5 37.43 27.38 
HYDRO 5.041 1.42 8.821 2.33 
PV 3.039 0.88 4.95 1.47 
WIND 1.599 0.72 4 0.33 
PGAS 22.27 4.541 30.3 13.15 
Table 8 Descriptive statistics. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters  data. 
Before proceeding to estimate the model, we test for the existence of unit roots in our series 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey Fuller, 1979). The test statistics in table 
A2 of the Appendix indicate that four of the time-series are I (1) with a 5% critical value. As a 
consequence, the regression model will be estimated in ﬁrst differences. 
Before turning to the ols results just a few comments on the correlation matrix of the variables 
included in the analysis. 
 𝚫 PRICE 𝚫 TOTDEM 𝚫 HYDRO 𝚫 PV 𝚫 WIND 𝚫PGAS 
𝚫 PRICE 1      
𝚫 TOTDEM 0.353 1     
𝚫 HYDRO 0.039 0.26 1    
𝚫 PV -0.081 0.041 0.18 1   
𝚫 WIND -0.24 -0.005 0.068 -0.08 1  
𝚫 PGAS 0.178 0.032 0.012 -0.17 0.066 1 
Table 9 Correlation Matrix. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters's  data 
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As expected, changes in the volume sold by variable renewable energy source are negatively 
correlated with the weekly average electricity price. Correlation is positive for changes in the 
volumes sold by HYDRO. This is because, although the variable cost for this technology is 
low, production from hydro plants is generally associated with periods of high demand since 
hydro electricity can be stored and used to equalize marginal cost for producers. We observe a 
positive correlation of price with the total electricity demand and the price of fossil fuels. This 
is consistent with the fact that the electrical system still depends largely on the use of fossil 
fuels so variation in the price of these technologies correlates in the same direction with the 
moves of the wholesale electricity price.  
The correlation matrix indicates that there are no problems of pairwise multicollinearity35. 
According to the calculations of the variance inﬂation indicator (VIF) for the estimated 
regressions is smaller than the often-used critical value of 10 for every case. This implicates 
that problems related to multicollinearity are very unlikely to exist. 
Under weak dependence of the variables, weak dependence of the residuals and the independent 
regressors we have a consistent OLS estimate (Woolridge, 2003). 
In order to control for the well-known seasonality of electricity prices, the model includes, in 
addition to a constant, three dummy variables indicating the season (summer, autumn, and 
winter. 
 
We thus estimate the following two models: 
1) 𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝚫𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝚫𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝚫𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+3
3
𝑘=1 𝑠𝑚𝑘𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡 
2) 𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝚫𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝚫𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝚫𝑃𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽4𝚫𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 +
𝛽5𝚫𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+5
3
𝑘=1 𝑠𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
Where delta represents the difference operator, 𝑠𝑚𝑘𝑡 (k=1,..,3) are the seasonal dummies. 
We use Durbin Waston (Durbin, 1970) to test for the existence of serial correlation in the OLS 
errors. According to the test statistics and the corresponding p-values (see Table 10), the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation of order 1 in the residuals is rejected in each case. As a 
consequence, Newey-West standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation are used for the estimations. 
The final model of Equation 1 is constructed in various steps to present results for several 
variations (Models 1A to 1C) in a procedure that provides further details on specific issues and 
                                                 
35 The frequently used critical values for pairwise multicollinearity lies between a correlation factor of 0.8 and 0.9. 
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also serves as a robustness test. The first two variations (1A and 1B) implement a reduction of 
the dataset to the upper quarter of high-demand weeks and the lower quarter of low-demand 
weeks. This is done to verify the hypothesis that renewable production has a much higher 
impact on electricity prices when the electricity system is closer to full capacity as observed by 
other papers (e.g. Ostergaard et al., 2006; Jonsson et al., 2010; Gelabert et al., 2011). The last 
variation (1C) estimates Equation 1 using monthly average instead of weekly averages.  
Model 2 involves a separation of solar and wind electricity sources through the use of separate 
coefficients that intend to identify the different production patterns of these technologies. We 
also add the weekly spot price of natural gas. 
The results for all model variations are reported in the following table. 
Table 10 Ols estimation of weekly changes in electricity prices.  
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1B Model 1C Model 2 
Dependent 
variable 
𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 High demand 
𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 
Low demand 
𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 
Monthly 
𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 
VRE split up 
𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.932 *** 
(0.218) 
5.37*** 
(2.06) 
3.632*** 
(1.359) 
0.87** 
(0.31) 
0.917*** 
(0.128) 
𝚫𝑽𝑹𝑬𝒕  -1.916*** 
(0.347) 
-3.59** 
(1.34) 
-2.47*** 
(0.625) 
-1.67** 
(0.75) 
 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  -0.110 
(1.00) 
-0.96 
(1.26) 
-1.277** 
(0.354) 
-0.79 
(0.78) 
-0.577 
(0.727) 
𝚫𝑷𝑽𝒕      -2.08* 
(1.01) 
𝚫𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕      -1.953*** 
(0.398) 
𝚫𝑷𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒕      1.455*** 
(0.36) 
Season dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 320 81 81 72 320 
Adj. R-squared 0.1843 0.174 0.195 0.1802 0.238 
dw 2.116 2.26 2.28 2.07 2.09 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: all models include an intercept; standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Newey West 1987). dw indicates the 
results of the Durbin Watson test after correcting for serial correlation in the residuals. 
*** indicates p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.01, *p-value < 0.05, . p-value<0.1 
In line with the theory of merit order effect and the previous research conducted in other 
countries, the coefficient for the variable renewable production variable is always negative and 
significant. Ceteris paribus, day-ahead electricity prices for Italy decrease by roughly 2 €/MWh 
for each additional expected GWh produced by variable renewable energy sources. The 
coefficient of the variable TOTDEM is positive and significant (in all models) in line with the 
economic theory that says that higher consumption increases the price of the product. This 
model explains the 18% of the weekly electricity prices. This merit order effect merely 
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corresponds to an electricity decrease of 3.6% since the average price was about 55 €/MWh for 
the period under study. 
More interesting results arise from the comparison of high and low-demand weeks (Model 1A 
and 1B). Evidence shows that when demand is high, the electricity price is determined by the 
cost of a high variable-cost technology, while when the demand is low the price is determined 
by the variable cost of a cheaper technology. So, we expect electricity generation under variable 
renewable energy sources to have a stronger negative effect on electricity prices when demand 
is high due to the fact that in these cases, these technologies are replacing technologies with a 
higher variable cost. In our findings the effect of renewable production on the electricity price 
appears to be more pronounced for high-demand weeks: while a 1GWh increase in electricity 
production by VRE decreases electricity prices by almost 2.47 €/MWh in the lowest demand, 
it decreases electricity prices by almost 3.6 €/MWh in the highest demand. This means that the 
negative effect is almost 30% stronger in the subsample of weeks with the highest demand with 
respect to the one with the lowest demand. 
This result is in line with evidence (e.g. Ostergaard et al., 2009; Senfuss et al., 2008, Weigt et 
al., 2009; Woo et al., 2011). 
Model 1C results indicate that the importance and magnitude of renewable production remain 
unchanged varying the frequency of our observations. The VRE coefficient is somehow 
smaller, which is not surprising because the valuable information could be lost when expanding 
the intervals into monthly observations and because we are smoothing the effects. 
As expected, model 2 shows that for any given level of electricity demand, if the volumes sold 
by PV and WIND increase by 1GWh, electricity price decreases on average of respectively 
2.08€/MWh and 1.95 €/MWh, with the coefficient of WIND very significant. Moreover, as 
expected, the positive and significant coefficient of the spot price of gas indicates that positive 
variations in this price increase wholesale electricity price.  
Since RES production varies over time, we run equation 1 and 2 on a yearly base. In this way, 
we take into account that the impact of RES (more specifically WIND and PV) may differ over 
time as the accumulated level of VRE electricity production increases. Results are presented in 
the following tables. 
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Table 11 Results of equation 1 in the single years. 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  12-18 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 𝚫𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.63* 
(0.27) 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
1.84*** 
(0.35) 
1.01*** 
(0.27) 
2.26*** 
(0.42) 
0.932 *** 
(0.218) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  0.31 
(1.54) 
-3.11** 
(0.96) 
-0.49 
(1.86) 
-1.08 
(1.38) 
-1.57 
(2.53) 
-0.110 
(1.00) 
𝚫𝐕𝑹𝑬𝒕  -3.17** 
(1.02) 
-3.16** 
(0.64) 
-1.95* 
(0.86) 
-1.49* 
(0.64) 
-2.20** 
(0.81) 
-1.916*** 
(0.347) 
Season 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 320 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.20 0.47 0.43 0.30 0.52 0.1843 
dw 2.02 1.97 2.25 2.08 2.02 2.116 
 
Table 12 Results of eq. 2 on a yearly basis. 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 12-18 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 𝚫𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.61* 
(0.24) 
0.28* 
(0.165) 
1.26** 
(0.44) 
0.94** 
(0.26) 
2.63 
(0.38) 
0.917*** 
(0.128) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  1.39 
(1.42) 
-2.9** 
(0.98) 
0.13 
(1.69) 
-0.76 
(1.36) 
-3.02. 
(1.54) 
-0.577 
(0.727) 
𝚫𝑷𝑽𝒕  -2.4 
(2.35) 
-5.13*** 
(1.04) 
-2.55 
(2.64) 
-2.5 
(2.20) 
-0.29 
(0.85) 
-2.08* 
(1.01) 
𝚫𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕  -3.44** 
(1.03) 
-3.05*** 
(0.43) 
-1.89** 
(0.61) 
-1.66* 
(0.69) 
-1.85* 
(0.88) 
-1.953*** 
(0.398) 
𝚫𝑷𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒕  3.68** 
(1.28) 
0.005 
(0.41) 
2.62** 
(1.18) 
1.67 
(0.83) 
2.67*** 
(0.71) 
1.455*** 
(0.36) 
Season 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 320 
Adj. R-squared 0.29 0.49 0.43 0.32 0.56 0.238 
dw 2.27 2.01 2.24 2.12 2.01 2.09 
Notes: all models include an intercept; standard are in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Newey West 1987). dw indicates the 
results of the Durbin Watson test after correcting for serial correlation in the residuals  
*** indicates p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.01, *p-value < 0.05, . p-value<0.1 
 
Starting from table 11 we detect MOE effects of renewables in each year in line with our 
expectations. We stress how the impact of VRE on electricity price was quite stronger in the 
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first years and then faces a strong reduction in its impact from 2015 due to the slight decrease 
of VRE generation in the last years. Moving to table 12 we detect the highly significant role of 
WIND in electricity price reduction, also here we note a decrease in WIND impact over the 
years. PV was highly significant only in 2014 at its peak in production.   
We also re-estimate model 2 (results in table A3 Appendix) considering other fossil fuels in 
place of the price of natural gas that could have an impact on electricity prices. Considering the 
price of coal36, results are very similar to the one obtained in our analysis, although we preferred 
the model with the price of natural gas due to the low importance of coal in the Italian electricity 
system. Taking into account the price of oil37 and CO2 allowances (EUA38) evidence that these 
fossil fuel prices are not significant.  
Summing up, the estimation results are quite robust across models. Significant coefficient 
always has the same sign and the effects of renewable production on prices are also consistent.   
Our results provide an empirical support to the theoretical prediction that, ceteribus paribus, an 
increase in electricity generation under VRE, in the analysis interpreted as an increase in the 
volume sold on the day-ahead market, reduces electricity prices. More precisely, we found that 
an increase of 1 GWh in electricity production under these sources is associated with an average 
decrease of 1.92 €/MWh. Our findings are quite compatible with MOE observed in other 
European electricity markets. 
                                                 
36 We took as reference the  COAL ICE API 2 (source Thomson Reuters: COAL ICE API 2 CIF ARA Euros Per 
Metric Tonne). 
37 We took as reference Brent, which  is the leading global price benchmark for Atlantic basin crude oils. It is used 
to price two thirds of the world's internationally traded crude oil supplies (source Thomson Reuters: Crude Oil 
BFO M1 Europe FOB). 
38 The EU-ETS is an economic instrument of environmental policy, "cap and trade" applied to greenhouse gas 
emissions, which sets a cap on emissions for companies and consists of a market of emission permits. The cap or 
maximum emission limit is expressed in the number of permits to be issued (EUA) which are distributed at auction 
or in free allocation to plant managers (Source: Thomson Reuters: EUA)  
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4.2.2 STAGE 2: ESTIMATION OF THE MOE IN  THE SIX GEOGRAPHICAL 
ZONES 
As mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, the electrical system is divided into portions of 
transmission networks - defined zones - for which exist, for the purposes of the safety of the 
electricity system, physical limits of energy transit exist with the corresponding neighboring 
areas. These transit limits are determined based on a 
calculation model based on the balance between 
electricity generation and consumption. The Italian 
electrical system is therefore divided into zones of the 
market, aggregates of geographical and/or virtual 
areas, each characterized by a zonal energy price. The 
process of identifying the areas of the relevant 
network takes into account the three-year 
Development Plan of the National Transmission 
Network.  
 
Figure 15 Evolution of the zonal prices. Source: GSE rapporto statistico 2017. 
In the last ten years, there has been an evolution of the dynamics of wholesale prices. The 
growing availability of incentive renewable energy must be considered among these factors. 
However, in recent years, there has been a gradual convergence of zonal prices, attributable to 
multiple factors, including the following: 
Figure 18 Maximum transits between geographical 
areas. Source: tpg.unige.it, 2016. 
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-development of electrical infrastructures thanks to some regulatory framework adopted in 
recent years (e.g. Ministerial decree of October 19, 201639).  
-AEEGSI regulatory activities (dispatching, prices offered by relevant plants in Sicily, etc.) 
-renewable increase and disposal of obsolete plants with higher marginal costs in market areas 
with historically higher prices. 
€/MWh PUN NORTH C.NORTH C.SOUTH SOUTH SICILY SARDINIA 
MEAN 
(SD) 
55.12 
(11.81) 
54.57 
(12.24) 
54.07 
(11.67) 
52.96 
(11.1) 
51.37 
(10.67) 
70.36 
(20.49) 
54.97 
(15.1) 
MIN 30.5 28.62 31.04 31.05 30.37 34.00 31.05 
MAX 90.7 91.19 87.91 85.28 83.21 139.78 157.22 
Table 13 Descriptive statistics of the zonal prices. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson reuters ’s data. 
In this paragraph, we are going to use the same methodology adopted in the previous paragraph 
to estimate the effect of renewable energy production on the zonal electricity price. The 
frequency of the data is the same as the variables of the model. ADF tests and correlation matrix 
are presented in tables A4-A15 in the Appendix. 
We will estimate the following equations: 
1) 𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝚫𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝚫𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝚫𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘+3
3
𝑘=1 𝑠𝑚𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
2) 𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝚫𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝚫𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝚫𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝚫𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝚫𝑃𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+5
3
𝑘=1 𝑠𝑚𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
  
                                                 
39 The decree is the legal basis for all national or regional administrations that want to promote investments for the 
adaptation and optimization of the electricity grid in the assisted areas of the national territory, under the conditions 
established by the same. 
The provision regulates the criteria and modalities for the granting of aid for the financing of energy infrastructures 
functional to increasing the availability of the network and contributing to the dissemination of the generation 
distributed from renewable sources, through the support of: 
- interventions for the creation of smart energy distribution networks (smart grids) 
- interventions on transmission networks strictly complementary to the interventions on the distribution 
network. 
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Results of the estimation 1 are presented in the next table : 
Table 14 Results of equation 1 for the zonal markets. 
 NORTH C-NORTH C-SOUTH SOUTH SICILY  SARDINIA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 𝚫𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.0018*** 
(0.0002) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.0025* 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  -0.0004 
(0.0008) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.07* 
(0.033) 
-0.027 
(0.036) 
𝚫𝑽𝑹𝑬𝒕  -0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.017* 
(0.007) 
-0.01*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.031*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
Season dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Adj. R-squared 0.179 0.132 0.195 0.2015 0.228 0.065 
dw 2.05 2.05 2.08 2.07 2.1 2.14 
Notes: all models include an intercept; standard are in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Newey 
West 1987). dw indicates the results of the Durbin Watson test after correcting for serial correlation in the residuals  
*** indicates p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.01, *p-value < 0.05, . p-value<0.1. 
 
As expected, the MOE is evident also taking into account the zonal markets. The coefficients 
for VRE are all negative and statistically significant. The price reduction range from 0.004 
€/MWh in the North zone to 0.031 €/MWh in Sicily.  The coefficients of the total demand are 
all positive and significant in line with our expectations. 
Splitting VRE in wind and PV, and adding the price of gas, results for equation 2, table 15, are 
the following: 
Starting from the North zone, as we expected, also the wholesale electricity price of the North 
zone is negatively correlated with the renewable energy source, and positively correlated with 
the total zonal electricity demand and the price of fossil fuels (see correlation matrix in 
Appendix). 
Analyzing the model, we can observe significant values for the total demand, PV and PGAS, 
while volumes sold from HYDRO and WIND are not significant.  
These results are not surprising if we consider that in this part of the country is concentrated 
most of the PV plants, installed power and production with the leadership driven by Veneto and 
Lombardy, with the latter ranking in the first position for installed systems and production and 
second for installed power.  
Results from this model show that a marginal increase of 1MWh of the hourly average weekly 
volumes sold by PV source reduces the weekly wholesale northern zonal electricity price of 
respectively of 0.0036€/MWh.  
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Moreover, as expected, the positive and significant coefficient of the spot price of natural gas 
indicates that a marginal increase in gas price increases wholesale zonal electricity price. The 
model has an explanatory power of 23%. 
Results for the C-north are similar to the North zone, with a significant coefficient for PV but 
with opposite sign. Observing the result for this zone in table 16 in the appendix we detect an 
opposite effect of renewables on electricity prices in this zone. This shows no evidence of the 
merit order effect.  
Considering C-South we detect a negative correlation between the wholesale electricity price 
and renewable energy source, and positive correlation with the total zonal electricity demand 
and the price of gas.  Results from the model show that they are merely in line with the results 
found at the system level. We can stress the high significance of WIND, due to the high installed 
capacity and production of Campania. PV and HYDRO have no significant role in explaining 
the Central South electricity price decrease. The model has an explanatory power of 22%. 
Considering South Italy, we observe from the correlation matrix only a negative correlation of 
price with PV and WIND. Moving to the model, as expected we observe a very high 
significance of WIND. The environmental and territorial characteristics of this part of the 
country such as windiness, orography, and accessibility make south Italy the main site of WIND 
production. In particular, the region with the highest production and installed power is Puglia 
(1188 production plants and 2494 MW of installed power). PV is quite significant due to region 
Puglia that has the highest installed capacity for this source in the country. The model has an 
explanatory power of 24%.  
About Sicily, analyzing the model, WIND, like in the previous models continue to have a 
significant impact on the electricity price reduction, this because Sicily is the second region in 
the country with the highest installed capacity and production from eolic source.  HYDRO also 
is merely significant and have a positive effect on price, this can be plausible due to the 
particular nature of this source. For the first time, we found no evidence of the impact of fossil 
fuel price on electricity prices. The explanatory power of the model is 22%.  
Finally, in Sardinia, we find correlation results in line with the ones at the system level. 
Although when we analyze the outcome of the model, we see that only WIND is significant, 
while the other renewable energy source, albeit having a negative impact on price, have a non-
significant coefficient.  
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Table 15 Results of eq. 2 for the zonal markets. 
 NORTH C-NORTH C-SOUTH SOUTH SICILY  SARDINIA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 𝚫𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.0018*** 
(0.00031) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  -0.0026 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.063. 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
𝚫𝑷𝑽𝒕  -0.0036* 
(0.0021) 
0.025 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.005* 
(0.0031) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.037 
(0.048) 
𝚫𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕  -0.035 
(0.152) 
-0.032 
(0.037) 
-0.0108*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.03*** 
(0.003 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
𝚫𝑷𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒕  1.35** 
(0.5) 
1.73*** 
(0.4) 
1.35*** 
(0.37) 
1.45 *** 
(0.34) 
0.211 
(0.67) 
2.06*** 
(0.59) 
Season 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Adj. R-squared 0.213 0.188 0.22 0.241 0.226 0.094 
dw 2.08 2.08 2.13 2.10 2.09 2.15 
Notes: all models include an intercept; standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Newey West 1987). dw indicates the 
results of the Durbin Watson test after correcting for serial correlation in the residuals *** indicates p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.01, *p-value < 0.05, . p-value<0.1 
 
Summing up: extending our main analysis to the zonal areas, results are merely in line with the 
analysis conducted on the whole country. VRE production decreases wholesale electricity 
prices everywhere (with an exception for C-North) with an interval ranging from 0.004€/MWh 
to 0.031€/MWh. Splitting VRE we can detect the importance of PV and WIND in the price 
formation of each zone and this represents also a key to understand the results found in the 
previous stage. WIND seems to be the main driver of the MOE in the majority of the zone, 
especially in those areas with high production and installed capacity from this source. PV is 
quite relevant in the North and C-North only. HYDRO, as expected, has no relevant role in the 
zonal MOE as observed also in the national analysis.  
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4.2.3 PANEL ANALYSIS 
Now we organize our data from stage 2 to combine two dimensions: spatial (cross-sectional) 
and temporal (time series). In this way, we obtain a solution to the difficulties involved in 
interpreting the partial regression coefficients in the framework of a cross-section only or time 
series only multiple regression. The obvious benefit is in terms of obtaining a large sample, 
giving more degrees of freedom, more variability, more information and less multicollinearity 
among the variables. Another advantage comes with the possibility of controlling for zonal or 
time heterogeneity, which the pure cross-section or pure time series data cannot afford.  
There are two methods that come before us: fixed effect and the random effect. The choice of 
the best methodology is not simple and trivial in our case. Taking into account the fixed effect, 
it assumes that a correlation between the zonal specific effect and the explanatory variables, i.e 
the volumes sold by the various technologies, in our model. This could be possible if we think 
about the link in wind production and the southern regions due to their specific environmental 
and territorial characteristics of sites such as windiness and orography. Considering random 
effects, its assume instead that the variation across zones is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the independent variables included in the model. Also this sounds good if we 
take into account solar production and the northern regions, in this case, we have a great 
concentration of PV production in areas where solar irradiation are not so powerful like in other 
regions. We are then in front of two valid alternatives, which present pros and cons. We resort 
to the help of the Hausman test to take a final decision. 
We then run four types of panel estimation: the classic fixed effect and random effect and to 
each of them we add dummy variable which controls for the year of the sample detecting some 
changes in the regulatory framework in renewables incentives. The Hausman test (result 
presented in TEST 2 Appendix) strongly suggests using the random effect model. This means 
we are assuming that the variation across zones are assumed to be random and uncorrelated 
with our independent variables included in the model and we suggest that differences within 
the zones can have some impact on the formation of the zonal electricity prices.  
We will estimate the following random effect model with the inclusion of year dummies 𝛾𝑚𝑘𝑡 
(k=1..6): 
Δ𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝜕 + 𝛽1Δ𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2Δ𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Δ𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4Δ𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5ΔP𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+5
6
𝑘=1
𝛾𝑚𝑘𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
60 
 
Cov(𝑢𝑖𝑡, Δ𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 , Δ𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 , Δ𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡 , Δ𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 , ΔP𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 ) = 0 
Cov(𝑣𝑖 , Δ𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 , Δ𝐻𝑌𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 , Δ𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡 , Δ𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 , ΔP𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 ) = 0  
 
Results of the estimation are presented in the following table (to be compared also with the 
results of table A17 in the appendix). 
Results are quite similar, within the various panel data estimation and in comparison with the 
estimates obtained in the previous stages. We see a negative effect of renewables on price 
effects with the coefficient for WIND very significant and much stronger than PV, also 
significant. HYDRO has no significant role in electricity price reduction while PGAS seems to 
have, as witnessed previously, a positive impact on electricity prices.  
                                                Table 16 Random effect estimation results. 
randomdumyear 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
𝚫𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕 
 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.02278*** 
(0.005) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  0.01 
(0.0158) 
𝚫𝑷𝑽𝒕  -0.0059** 
(0.002) 
𝚫𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕  -0.099** 
(0.045) 
𝚫𝑷𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒕  1.03 *** 
(0.34) 
Year dummies yes 
Observations 1920 
R-squared 0.1328 
Wald chi2 437.22 
Prob> chi2= 0.000 
                                        *** indicates p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.01, *p-value < 0.05, . p-value<0.1 
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4.3 EFFECT OF RENEWABLES ON ELECTRICITY VOLATILITY 
Results from the previous section stressed that renewable energy sources with zero marginal 
costs decrease Italian electricity prices. Now we want to estimate the effect on volatility.  
While the dampening effect of renewable energy generation on electricity prices level is well-
studied in many papers, the literature on how this power generation affects electricity price 
volatility is scarce and inconclusive. Not only the number of studies is insufficient to make an 
appropriate conclusion, neither there is a similar approach on what price volatility measure to 
use (daily, weekly, monthly). 
Intuitively, there is a solid explanation for the question about why electricity prices become 
more volatile when the renewable energy capacity increases. It is known that controlling the 
energy output from intermittent energy generators is harder than doing this for conventional 
energy sources. If there are difficulties in meeting the market demand in time, electricity grid 
operators may have to purchase extra energy to supply the market and to avoid shortages. In 
such a scenario, the equilibrium market price will be higher compared to the price when a grid 
operator provides the necessary supply in time without purchasing it from somewhere else. 
With an increasing share of the intermittently available energy resources, this should be 
happening more frequently since the electricity supply is becoming less predictable. 
In the paragraph, I will investigate whether the increased share of energy produced by 
renewables leads to the above-described inefficiencies in the Italian (and zonal) electricity 
market. In particular, I will study whether prices have become more volatile in response to the 
more unpredictable nature of the energy supply. 
Empirical studies of electricity price volatility have been conducted in the US, Canada, some 
European countries, Australia and New Zealand.  
The paper by Woo et al. (2011) on the Texas electricity market, after demonstrating the negative 
relationship between an increase of wind generation and the level of electricity spot prices, 
shows one more valuable insight: increases in wind power output tend to enhance the daily 
spot-price variance. The magnitude of the increases in price volatility varies across different 
electricity markets: from less than 1% to 5% in response to a 10% increase in the installed 
capacity of wind generation. 
When reviewing empirical studies in Europe, one cannot overlook the German electricity 
market. There is a recent paper by J.Ketterer (2014) that uses a generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to test whether changes in wind power output 
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have an effect on price volatility. The approach is not new40, but very appropriate since a 
GARCH model can replicate the volatility behavior properly.  
In the paper by R.Green et al. the British (2010) electricity market is studied. The study 
considers daily variation in electricity prices and it is able to make insightful inference about 
price behavior during the day, however, no conclusions can be made about the impact of 
increased wind power generation on price volatility in the long-run, as such a relationship is not 
studied in the paper. Additionally, the paper finds out that the effect is more persistent during 
the summer months. This particular finding is also recorded in the study of the Australian 
electricity market by H.Higgs et al. (2015) throughout September, November, December, and 
January (summer in Australia), the price volatility is higher than it is in the rest of the year. 
Electricity price volatility behavior has been recently studied for the German and the Danish 
electricity markets by T.Rintamäki et al.(2014, 2017) and the findings are different when the 
daily or weekly electricity price volatility is considered. Weekly volatility is increasing in both 
electricity markets when intermittently available generators are introduced. Daily volatility, on 
contrary, behaves differently: in Denmark, it is decreasing and in Germany, it is increasing 
when the WIND power output is growing. One way to explain the inconsistency in the results 
for the daily volatility is to remember that German and Danish electricity markets have different 
renewables generation mix: while Denmark has only wind power, Germany has both wind and 
solar energy. As solar power is produced only during peak hours, this decreases daily price 
volatility by decreasing high peak hour prices. As wind and solar power have opposite effects 
on volatility, the results for German electricity daily volatility is inconclusive. 
In the following section, I will continue on the path traced by T.Rintamäki et al to compute the 
effect of intermittent renewable energy  (WIND and PV) on the wholesale weekly electricity 
price volatility in the day ahead market. I will adopt the methodology based on Mauritzen 
(2010) who modeled the variation of daily prices as a seasonal autoregressive moving average 
model (SARMA) in which wind power production was an exogenous regressor. He conducted 
his studies on the Danish market and found that that Danish wind power decreases the daily 
volatility of prices. The benefits of this methodology are that its results are straightforward to 
interpret, and that one-day ahead forecasts for electricity prices can be developed based on the 
data from previous days and information on regular consumption patterns.         
                                                 
40 Previously, GARCH modelling was used to examine the relationship between trading volume and price volatility 
or to explore how changes in market design affect the volatility of price. 
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4.3.1 METHODOLOGY AND DATA     
To estimate the effect of exogenous variables such as wind and solar power on a dependent 
variable of interest such as electricity price volatility, we use the seasonally adjusted 
autoregressive moving average (SARMA(p,q)(P, Q)[s]) model: 
𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑣𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝜖𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑃
𝑖=1
. 𝑣𝑡−𝑖𝑠 . +𝑠 ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑄
𝑖=1
𝜖𝑡−𝑖𝑠 . +𝑠 𝜖𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑇𝑥𝑡    (1) 
Where 𝑣𝑡 is the dependent variable during time period t and 𝑥𝑡    a vector of exogenous variables, 
There are p autoregressive (AR) terms 𝑣𝑡−𝑖, q moving average (MA) terms 𝜖𝑡−𝑖, P seasonal 
autoregressive (SAR) terms 𝑣𝑡−𝑖. 𝑠  with periodicity ofa  s, and Q seasonal moving average 
(SMA) terms 𝜖𝑡−𝑖. 𝑠  with periodicity of s wa ith the coefficients 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 • s, and 𝛽𝑖 • s, 
respectively. In other words, the terms 𝑣𝑡−𝑖 are lagged values of 𝑣𝑡  and 𝜖𝑡−𝑖 Gaussian white 
noise error terms. The impact of the exogenous variables on price volatility is estimated by the 
parameter vector  𝛾  using R. 
Our data for the national level and the six zones consist of the average weekly hourly national 
prices (in €/MWh), the average weekly hourly volumes of wind, solar, hydro sold in the day 
ahead spot market. We account for fuel prices by including the weekly natural gas spot price 
(in €/MWh, PSV Italia). The dataset spans from 7 may 2012 to 26 June 2018. 
Our measure of price volatility for week w is the logarithm of the standard deviation calculated 
from daily average prices 𝑝𝑑 and weekly average prices 𝑝𝑤 =
1
7
 ∑ 𝑝𝑑
7
𝑑=1 . 
𝑣𝑤 = ln (√
1
7
∑(𝑝𝑑
7
𝑑=1
− 𝑝𝑤)
2) 
We take the natural logarithm to make the time series stationary and to improve the model fit. 
Also, all exogenous variables 𝑥𝑡    in Eq. (1) are transformed into natural logarithm form (except 
pgas which is in first difference), and, thus, their coefficients 𝛾 can be interpreted as elasticities. 
This assumption of constant elasticity between the exogenous variables and price volatility is 
more reasonable than assuming that changes in demand, for example, lead to equal changes in 
price volatility at different demand levels (Rintamaki et al. 2016). 
The table below list all the variables included in the model. 
Then we will conduct our analysis first considering the system as a whole and then we will take 
into account each zone to detect the effect of variable renewable energy on the weekly 
electricity price volatility. 
 
 
64 
 
variable role explanation 
𝒗𝒘 Dependent variable The standard deviation of the daily average prices 
during week w.  
 
𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒘 Exogenous variable Average volume sold from WIND during week w 
𝒑𝒗𝒘 “ Average volume sold from solar during week w 
𝒉𝒚𝒅𝒓𝒐𝒘 “ Average volume sold from HYDRO during week 
w 
𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒅_𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒘 “ The share of average volume sold by WIND of the 
average demand of the week w. 
𝒑𝒗_𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒘 “ The share of average volume sold by solar of the 
average demand of the week w. 
𝒉𝒚𝒅𝒓𝒐_𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒘 “ The share of average volume sold by HYDRO of 
the average demand of the week w. 
𝒑𝒈𝒂𝒔𝒘 “ Average gas price during week w 
Table 17 Exogenous variables in our models. We take the natural logarithm of all variables with the exception of the price of 
gas, which is in the first difference. 
 
4.3.2 RES EFFECT ON PUN VOLATILITY: 
We confirm the stationarity of the time series by applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test.  
variable ADF test 
𝒗𝑰𝑻 -5.452 
𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒅𝑰𝑻 -3.74 
𝒑𝒗𝑰𝑻 -4.8401 
𝒉𝒚𝒅𝒓𝒐𝑰𝑻 -3.85 
𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒅_𝒑𝒆𝒏𝑰𝑻 -3.7934 
𝒑𝒗_𝒑𝒆𝒏𝑰𝑻 -4.0659 
𝒉𝒚𝒅𝒓𝒐_𝒑𝒆𝒏𝑰𝑻 -3.80 
∆𝒑𝒈𝒂𝒔𝑰𝑻 -5.9555 
Table 18 ADF results, all the weekly time series passed the test at the 5% level. 
 
A way to specify the order (p,q)(P, Q)[s] of the model can be observing the autocorrelation 
(ACF) and partial autocorrelation functions (PACFs) of the dependent variable. 
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Figure 16 ACF of PUN weekly price volatility. Own elaboration on GME’s data. 
 
 
Figure 17 PACF of PUN weekly price volatility. Own elaboration on GME ’s data. 
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Figure 18 The natural logarithm of the weekly price volatility of PUN. Own elaboration on GME ’s data. 
The autocorrelation function has a downward trend as older data are less relevant. 
In both graphs, we observe high peaks at the first lag and then near multiples of seven indicating 
a sort of seasonality that coincides with the start, mid and end of each season (especially in the 
ACF). 
We choose the optimal model by stepwise addition of independent variables starting from a 
simple AR(1) and MA(1) and then try also a seven-week seasonality. In the selection process, 
we omit all exogenous variables 𝑥𝑡    and require all coefficient 𝛼, 𝛽 to be significant at a 5% 
level.  If a variable in a particular model becomes statistically insignificant, then we do not add 
other variables because they are likely to be insignificant. Also, if the addition of a new variable 
does not improve the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) compared with the previous model, 
then we stop.  
To compare the candidates in this process, we evaluate the AIC score, perform the Ljung-Box 
(L-B) test for the residual autocorrelation, and examine the ACF and the PACF of the residuals 
of the models. 
We report the model iteration: 
MODEL AIC L-B 
SARMA (0,1)(0,0)[7] 406.37 4 
SARMA (1,0)(0,0)[7] 389.67 30 
SARMA (1,0)(1,1)[7] 388.65 30 
SARMA (1,1)(0,0)[7] 387.43 30 
SARMA (1,1)(1,1)[7] 386.96 30 
Table 19 Statistically significant and AIC-improving iteration steps. We have omitted models that failed to improve the AIC 
score or have insignificant variables. 
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We run the following regression to estimate the impact of different explanatory variables on 
the Italian electricity price volatility. We adopt a SARMA (1,1)(1,1)[7] as suggested by the 
model iteration in the previous table.  
The AR(1) accounts for the short-term price volatility development, the SAR(1) deals with 
seasonality in the data. Adding MA(1) and SMA(1) provide stochastic parts to the development 
of the price volatility and improves the fit of the model. Various exogenous variables with the 
associated parameters are added to the RHS of the equation. 
𝑣𝐼𝑇 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑣𝑤−1 + 𝛼7𝑣𝑤−7 + 𝜖𝑤 + 𝛽1𝜖𝑤−1 + 𝛽7𝜖𝑤−7 + 𝛾
𝑇𝑥𝑡     
In models 1 to 7, we specify separately each subset of exogenous variable 𝑥𝑡    and the in model 
8 we consider the effect of the intermittent renevable energy and HYDRO. 
Our main findings from the above equation are that the coefficient for WIND in model 1 is 
statistically significant at a 5% level according to the Z-test. The interpretation is that increasing 
the amount of weekly volume of WIND sold on the day ahead spot market by 1% increases the 
weekly volatility of prices by 0.35%.  We see a slightly lower impact on the price volatility 
when we take into account model 3, which considers the share of WIND in the total volumes 
sold from the various technologies; here the increase is only of 0.15%. Results from PV are not 
straightforward because results from model 2 highlight a negative but not significant impact of 
a unitary percentage increase in the volume sold by this source, but considering PV penetration 
in the market in model 5, we observe a slightly significant effect (10% level) of 0.25%. 
Considering hydroelectric in model 3 and 6, we see negative effects on the price volatilities 
which by the way are not significant. With model 7, we test for the impact of first difference on 
natural gas price and find a slightly positive impact on the weekly price volatility, although 
highly non-significant. In fact, weekly changes in the natural gas spot prices are small, and, 
thus, they are unlikely to affect the short-term volatility of the prices. Finally, combining 
WIND, PV and HYDRO in model 8 confirm our main finds, i.e. a significant positive effect of 
WIND on the weekly price volatility and no statistically significant effect of PV and HYDRO 
on the dependent variable. This means that when the installed capacity of WIND increases, the 
available supply increases and the parallel shifts are larger, and this contributes to growing 
weekly volatility. This impact can be amplified by highly clustered power farms. However 
average weekly solar and hydro power are not found to contribute to the weekly price volatility. 
In all the models (with some few exceptions) the AIC improves after adding the exogenous 
variables. We also report the lag at which the Ljung-Box test fails at a 1% significant level. 
All models perform well with all lags. 
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Figure 19 ACF of model 1 residuals. 
Following we have the table with the effect of explanatory variables on the Italian price 
volatility. The coefficients α and β are al significant at least 5% level. All estimates parameters 
and external variables are robust.  
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 model 8 
𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐈𝐓 0.357 ** 
(0.13) 
      0.329 * 
(0.137) 
𝐩𝐯𝐈𝐓  -0.506 
(0.341) 
     -0.322  
(0.35) 
𝐡𝐲𝐝𝐫𝐨𝐈𝐓   -0.224 
(0.371) 
    -0.1821 
(0.482) 
𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐝_𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐈𝐓    0.142* 
(0.057) 
    
𝐩𝐯_𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐈𝐓     -0.246 . 
(0.13) 
   
𝐡𝐲𝐝𝐫𝐨_𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐈𝐓      -0.168 
(0.15) 
  
∆𝐩𝐠𝐚𝐬𝐈𝐓       0.00021 
(0.013) 
 
𝛂𝟏 0.664 0.659 0.679 0.661 0.666 0.664 0.666 0.666 
𝛂𝟕 -0.25 -0.277 -0.270 -0.246 -0.288 -0.267 -0.277 -0.254 
𝛃𝟏 0.78 0.938 0.826 0.801 0.940 0.935 0.935 0.793 
𝛃𝟕 -0.855 -0.999 -0.892 -0.872 -0.99 -0.999 -0.999 -0.862 
AIC 382.4 386.74 386.6 383.44 385.72 387.88 388.97 385.47 
L-B 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Table 20 Estimation results. The coefficients α and β are al significant at least 5% level. All estimates parameters and external 
variables are robust.   
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3.3.4 RES EFFECT ON ZONAL PRICE VOLATILITY 
Now we go deep in our analysis trying to get the drivers of weekly electricity price volatility in 
each of the six zones. The external variables we will consider are those of model 8. Similarly, 
as the previous chapter, we will use the variables related to each zonal market and take the 
natural logarithm. Figure 3 and table 18 in the appendix show the volatility pattern and some 
summary statistics.  
We will consider each zone specific SARMA model, selecting the optimal equation for the 
price volatility following the same process implemented previously. The model selection results 
(AIC score) are presented in the table below.  
 
model North C-North C-South South Sicily Sardinia 
SARMA 
(1,0)(1,0)[7] 
403.42 
 
380.45 410.88 434.58 563.23 502.18 
SARMA 
(1,0)(0,1)[7] 
402.83 379.49 410.82 
 
434.52 561.14 502.09 
SARMA 
(1,1)(0,0)[7] 
400.8 376.67 409.56 423.62 539.16 495.17 
SARMA 
(1,1)(0,1)[7] 
400.22 376.13 410.58 424.62 538.01 496.85 
SARMA 
(1,1)(1,1)[7] 
394.97 375.57 413.04 424.46 537.60 498.7 
Table 21 Statistically significant and AIC-improving iteration steps. We have omitted models that failed to improve the AIC 
score or have insignificant variables. 
For North, C-North, and Sicily we adopted the same SARMA model of the previous step, i.e. a 
SARMA (1,1)(1,1)[7], while for C-South, South, and Sardinia the AIC score suggests using a 
SARMA (1,1)(0,0)[7]. 
1) 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑣𝑤−1 + 𝛼7𝑣𝑤−7 + 𝜖𝑤 + 𝛽1𝜖𝑤−1 + 𝛽7𝜖𝑤−7 + 𝛾
𝑇𝑥𝑡     
 
2) 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑣𝑤−1 + 𝜖𝑤 + 𝛽1𝜖𝑤−1 + 𝛾
𝑇𝑥𝑡     
 
Results are presented in table 19. 
Our main finding is that the coefficient for WIND power is statistically significant in every 
zone except for North and C-North where we know from the previous section that the 
production from this source is marginal. Increasing the amount of weekly WIND production by 
1% increases the weekly zonal volatility from 0.16-0.85 %. The effects are stronger in South 
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Italy and Sicily, most likely due to the combination of higher WIND capacity in these areas. 
These results are in line with the one found at the national level.  
PV follows the same pattern seen in analysis on the effect on prices, i.e. we have a merely 
significant impact in the areas where we have relevant production and installed capacity from 
this source. In particular, we observe a significant positive impact in the North where we have 
the greatest concentration of production of solar. A 1% increase in the volume sold in North 
Italy increases the zonal weekly electricity price of almost 1 percent. We observe a strong 
positive impact also in the south of the peninsula and this is explained by the high installed 
capacity from southern regions like Puglia.  In general, PV is insignificant in most areas, and 
this is a result in line with the one obtained at the national level. 
Considering HYDRO, we note coefficients statistically insignificant, except for North and 
Sicily. This is plausible if we consider the high production, plants and installed capacity in these 
areas. The impact of a 1% increase in the volumes of HYDRO sold in these zonal markets has 
opposite effects, in North Italy, we observe an increase in price volatility, the opposite in Sicily. 
For all the other zones we observe non-significant coefficients. This result is in line with the 
one found in the price impact analysis. 
For all areas, with few exceptions, the AIC score improve after adding these external variables. 
We also report the lags at which the Ljung-Box test fails at a 1% significant level. Models for 
C-North and C-South have some autocorrelation at low lags but the models of the other zones 
perform well with all lags. 
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that wind power production at the national and zonal level 
have statistically and economically significant effect on the day ahead weekly price volatility. 
In the short run, Italian weekly price volatility is higher when there are more volumes sold by 
this source in the market. This effect finds evidence at all zone (except for North and C–North). 
In periods with high price volatility, producers and consumers need to optimize their generation 
and demand allocation to maximize their proﬁts and to minimize their costs, respectively. From 
the power system point of view, the adoption of more wind power production requires 
mechanisms to cope with intermittent supply and to decrease balancing costs (Kunz, 2013).  
On the consumer side, enhanced understanding of the causes of volatility can be used to design 
tariffs that incentivize demand response (Dupont et al., 2014), which is likely to mitigate the 
costs of balancing caused by the intermittency of wind. The rise in VRE generation further 
enhance for a greater cross-border integration and raises the value of more interconnection with 
the near European countries. The interconnection can supply more backup power when VRE 
are unavailable; by connecting areas with uncorrelated wind, they reduce the variability of that 
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source and dampen the volatility of the power prices. Sharing reserves across borders reduces 
the cost of ensuring reliability. 
A subject for further research could be to use different modeling techniques. Following Ketterer 
(2014), we can estimate the impact of RES power on price volatility using a GARCH model. 
On the other hand price volatility can be explored as a function of time and RES penetration 
using the non-parametric regression model of Jónsson et al. (2010). Also, the link between RES 
generation levels and supply curve elasticities can be established more formally using real 
supply and demand curve data (see Dillig et al., 2016) or agent-based or complementarity 
models. 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 North C-North C-South South Sicily Sardinia 
WIND -0.046 
(0.095) 
0.16 
(0.097) 
0.26 * 
(0.02) 
0.701 *** 
(0.13) 
0.859 *** 
(0.157) 
0.34*** 
(0.102) 
PV 0.93 * 
(0.418) 
0.022 . 
(0.29) 
-0.288 
(0.29) 
0.49 . 
(0.26) 
0.23 
(0.346) 
-0.07 
(0.431) 
HYDRO 0.36* 
(0.217) 
-0.086 
(0.264) 
-0.091 
(0.283) 
-0.2 
(0.25) 
-0.82 *** 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(0.208) 
𝛂𝟏 0.667 0.69 0.602 0.700 0.758 0.801 
𝛂𝟕 -0.22 -0.301   -0.478  
𝛃𝟏 0.88 0.505 -0.22 -0.4 0.72 -0.35 
𝛃𝟕 -0.99 -0.613   -0.659  
AIC 393.5 378.43 409.05 401.87 508.92 489.32 
L-B 19 9 9 30 30 30 
Table 22 Estimation results. The coefficients α and β are al significant at least 5% level. All estimates parameters and external 
variables are robust. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This work tries to contribute to a very relevant line of research in the assessment of the impact 
of an increase in renewable energy in electricity markets, particularly on the electricity prices 
and its volatility. I thought it was particularly interesting to perform this study in Italy, where 
an active system of public support to renewable sources is leading to a considerable expansion 
of these energy sources and electricity pricing is at the center of intense debate.  
To detect the impact electricity prices, I developed a full ex-post empirical analysis for Italy 
and the country’s zonal markets using a multivariate regression. I considered data on the weekly 
use of technologies and electricity prices from May 2012 to June 2018. As a major finding, my 
work reports that a marginal increase of 1 GWh of electricity volumes sold in the Italian day 
ahead-market by RES (in particular the variable renewable energy, VRE) decreases the Italian 
electricity price of almost 1.9€/MWh. I tried then to understand the impact of the main 
components of the VRE, wind and solar, on electricity prices reduction and found a negative 
impact of respectively 1.95€/MWh and 2.08€/MWh. No evidence is found for idroelectric 
source for electricity price reduction. VRE is proved to caused electricity price reduction also 
in the zonal markets, where the effects range from a decrease of 0.004 €/MWh in North to 0.031 
€/MWh in Sicily. Decomposing VRE, it is interesting to stress how the impacts of wind and 
PV vary across zone depending on the specific zone installed capacity and production: wind is 
the main driver of the electricity price reduction in the southern zonal areas while solar has a 
more significant decreasing impact in the northern zone price. Lastly, I implemented a random 
effect panel model to get rid of the difficulties involved in interpreting the partial regression 
coefficients in the framework of a cross-section only or time series only multiple regression. 
Results of the panel analysis confirmed the negative and significant impact of wind and PV in 
the zonal prices reduction.  
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I focused on the volatility of electricity price trying 
to understand the effect of the increase of renewables in the market on price volatility. Through 
a seasonally adjusted autoregressive moving average (SARMA)  model I demonstrated how 
unitary percentage increase in the volumes sold by wind increases the weekly volatility of the 
Italian electricity price by about 0.30%, I didn't found statistically significant evidence for solar 
and hydro. Repeating the same methodology taking into consideration the 6 zones, I found that 
increasing the amount of weekly wind sale by 1% increases the weekly zonal volatility from 
0.26-0.85 % in all zones except North and C-North. Solar in contrast with the analysis at a 
national level reveals to be a driver of electricity price volatility increase in the zones where the 
production from this source is consistent. 
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Combining our two results we can conclude that the sources responsible for the MOE, i.e the 
electricity price reduction are also the main drivers for the increase in electricity price volatility. 
Given the EU policies, renewable capacity will continue to increase in Italy. Given the recently 
adopted renewable energy target,  2030 “Framework for climate and energy”, based on the 2020 
framework, renewable goals are set at a threshold of at least 27% share of energy consumption. 
The price impacts I have presented depend on the total amount of production and the variations 
in it. Hence, the impacts become stronger unless the production mix or market design changes. 
Lower electricity prices do not encourage new investments in electricity generation. In addition, 
higher price volatility in longer-term introduces uncertainty which increases risk. As installed 
capacity increases and technology matures, renewable electricity regulation should be 
developed and adapted further, towards a more market-oriented structure that remunerates 
renewable electricity during phases of high electricity prices (Ketterer 2011).   
Further extension of my work can entail the use of peak and off-peak prices and quantities. My 
impossibility to get this kind of data subdivision induced me to conclude that renewable energy 
and other market fundamentals have a constant impact in time on the electricity price formation 
process. I was not able to distinguish between different diurnal impacts of VRE, fossil fuel 
prices and demand, although it is known that the load level shows different patterns within one 
day, which implies different production design. 
With the availability weekly peak and off-peak data I could have derived the following results: 
 For renewable energies, starting from the observation of a Duck Chart and the relative 
net load (normal load minus wind and PV generation) evidence would show how the 
“belly” of the duck is most pronounced in off-peak hours (night and early morning) for 
wind and in peak hours (noon) for solar. In this sense, analyzing separately the two 
sources, I can expect negative signs and expect highly variable price adaption process 
to wind infeed, particularly for the night hours, and this occurs because of the need to 
meet low demand during night hours with a low marginal cost of production technology 
and because of the excess electricity produce versus low demand during these hours. 
For PV the coefficient magnitude will be higher over noon, given the high sunshine 
intensity. 
 Responses for fossil fuel prices, in particular for gas, is expected to be higher in the 
noon-peak hours when many fuel plants situated to the right of the merit-order curve 
are turned on. 
Further impacts of VRE on wholesale power prices can be investigated such as temporal (e.g., 
diurnal or seasonal) and geographic (e.g., between price hubs and individual nodes) patterns of 
prices, and a greater frequency of low or negative prices. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1  Division of components of the real LCOE to 2011 (Carson 2012). 
 
 
 
In the years after the substantial fall 
in demand (-5.9%) occurred in 2009, 
due to the crisis, there was a two-year 
period (2010-2011) of partial 
recovery of volumes, but a new 
three-year period (2012-2014) took 
place. The contraction brought 
electricity demand to levels 
comparable to those in 2002. A 
Figure A1 Total demand of the weekly electricty price. Own eleboration on  
GME’s data. 
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turnaround is registered in 2015, followed by a slight decline the following year, and the final 
recovery in 2017. 
 
Table A2 ADF Tests. 
 ADF-levels ADF-1st difference 
PRICE -3.94 -8.31 
TOTDEM* -8.76  -10.67 
HYDRO -2.87 -5.93 
PV -4.8097 -4.396 
WIND -7.57 -9.998 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Notes: MacKinnon(1996) critical value for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root are -2.57(for 10% confidence 
level), -2.86 (for 5% confidence level), and -3.43 (for 1% confidence level) for the models with drift only; -3.12(for 
10% confidence level), -3.41(for 5% confidence level), -3.96(for 1% confidence level) for models that include also 
trend. We include a trend in the specification of the model in those cases where it was significant (*).We search 
for the number of lags to be included in the model such that Rsquare is maximized while minimizing at the same 
time the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Table A3 Results of model 2 using the price of alternative fossil fuels 
Model 2 
Dipendent variable RES split up 
𝚫𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.97*** 
(0.22) 
0.95*** 
(0.21) 
0.93*** 
(0.13) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  -0.81 
(0.73) 
-0.69 
(0.74) 
-0.577 
(0.727) 
𝚫𝑷𝑽𝒕  -1.52. 
(0.9) 
-2.49* 
(1.03) 
-2.61* 
(1.101) 
𝚫𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕  -1.87*** 
(0.37) 
1.87*** 
(0.36) 
-1.87*** 
(0.398) 
𝚫𝑷𝑪𝑶𝑨𝑳𝒕  0.55*** 
(0.15) 
  
𝚫𝑶𝑰𝑳𝒕   0.21. 
(0.12) 
 
𝚫𝑬𝑼𝑨𝒕    -1.03 
(0.643) 
Season dummies yes yes yes 
Observations 81 72 320 
Adj. R-squared 0.2319 0.2057 0.238 
dw 2.08 2.06 2.09 
. 
Notes: all models include an intercept; standard are in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Newey 
West 1987). dw indicates the results of the Durbin Watson test after correcting for serial correlation in the residuals  
*** indicates p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.01, *p-value < 0.05, . p-value<0.1 
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Figure A2 Evolution of fossil fuels prices. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data. 
 
 
 𝚫price 𝚫totdem 𝚫hydro 𝚫pv 𝚫wind 𝚫pricegas 
𝚫price 1      
𝚫totdem 0.384 1     
𝚫hydro -0.043 0.244 1    
𝚫pv -0.090 0.070 0.21 1   
𝚫wind -0.010 0.056 0.054 -0.15 1  
𝚫pricegas 0.193 0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.04 1 
                        Table A4 Correlation matrix North. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data 
 ADF-LEVELS ADF-1ST DIFFERENCE 
PRICE* -4.68 -8.43 
TOTDEM -8.76  -11.07 
HYDRO -3.18 -6.1 
PV -2.28 -4.12 
WIND* -5.43 -8.03 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Table A5 ADF results North. 
  
V 
 
 
 𝚫price 𝚫totdem 𝚫hydro 𝚫pv 𝚫wind 𝚫pricegas 
𝚫price 1      
𝚫totdem 0.323 1     
𝚫hydro 0.109 0.125 1    
𝚫pv 0.186 0.0013 0.091 1   
𝚫wind -0.091 -0.024 0.061 -0.26 1  
𝚫pricegas 0.1721 0.0204 0.006 -0.15 0.073 1 
                    Table A6 Correlation matrix C-North. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data. 
 ADF-LEVELS ADF-1ST DIFFERENCE 
PRICE -4.19 -8.07 
TOTDEM* -6.14  -9.00 
HYDRO -4.24 -7.69 
PV -3.1 -5.87 
WIND* -7.22 -8.65 
GEOTERM -4.84 -9.25 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Table A7 ADF results C-North. 
 
 𝚫price 𝚫totdem 𝚫hydro 𝚫pv 𝚫wind 𝚫pricegas 
𝚫price 1      
𝚫totdem 0.3026 1     
𝚫hydro -0.026 -0.035 1    
𝚫pv -0.0268 0.0285 0.114 1   
𝚫wind -0.3141 -0.004 0.142 0.007 1  
𝚫pricegas 0.1467 -0.051 0.030 -0.065 -0.038 1 
               Table A8 Correlation matrix C-South. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data. 
 ADF-LEVELS ADF-1ST DIFFERENCE 
PRICE -3.19 -8.30 
TOTDEM -5.06  -8.031 
HYDRO -2.99 -6.38 
PV -2.78 -5.39 
WIND -8.51 -10.12 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Table A9 ADF reults C-South. 
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 𝚫price 𝚫totdem 𝚫hydro 𝚫pv 𝚫wind 𝚫pricegas 
𝚫price 1      
𝚫totdem 0.067 1     
𝚫hydro 0.029 0.028 1    
𝚫pv -0.121 -0.036 0.111 1   
𝚫wind -0.428 0.024 0.099 0.068 1  
𝚫pricegas 0.173 -0.023 -0.008 -0.153 0.044 1 
            Table A10 Correlation matrix South. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data.  
 ADF-LEVELS ADF-1ST DIFFERENCE 
PRICE -3.78 -7.96 
TOTDEM* -4.84  -8.59 
HYDRO -3.45 -7.94 
PV -3.1 -6.75 
WIND -8.05 -10.38 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Table A11 ADF results South.  
 
 
 𝚫price 𝚫totdem 𝚫hydro 𝚫pv 𝚫wind 𝚫pricegas 
𝚫price 1      
𝚫totdem 0.167 1     
𝚫hydro -0.029 0.089 1    
𝚫pv 0.167 0.0689 0.155 1   
𝚫wind -0.428 0.0449 0.196 -0.24 1  
𝚫pricegas 0.066 0.052 -0.105 -0.07 0.075 1 
      Table A12 Correlation matrix Sicily. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data.  
 ADF-LEVELS ADF-1ST DIFFERENCE 
PRICE* -5.3 -9.60 
TOTDEM* -4.026  -6.72 
HYDRO* -3.16 -7.93 
PV -2.97 -4.9 
WIND -7.02 -8.74 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Table A13 ADF results Sicily.  
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 𝚫price 𝚫totdem 𝚫hydro 𝚫pv 𝚫wind 𝚫pricegas 
𝚫price 1      
𝚫totdem 0.153 1     
𝚫hydro -0.013 0.037 1    
𝚫pv -0.0279 0.015 0.094 1   
𝚫wind -0.254 -0.175 -0.027 -0.007 1  
𝚫pricegas 0.144 -0.0704 0.021 0.057 0.087 1 
Table A14 Correlation matrix Sardinia. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data.  
 ADF-LEVELS ADF-1ST DIFFERENCE 
PRICE* -4.86 -8.76 
TOTDEM* -3.97  -9.27 
HYDRO* -4.35 -7.51 
PV -2.96 -4.71 
WIND -8.6 -10.54 
PGAS -1.76 -6.359 
Table A15 ADF results.  
      
Table A16  Comparison of fixed effect and random effects outcome.  
 fixed fixdumyear random randomdumyear 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 𝚫𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕 
𝚫𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑴𝒕  0.002279*** 
(0.0005) 
0.002278*** 
(0.0005) 
0.002279*** 
(0.0005) 
0.002278*** 
(0.0005) 
𝚫𝑯𝒀𝑫𝑹𝑶𝒕  -0.009 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.097 
(0.015) 
0.01 
(0.0158) 
𝚫𝑷𝑽𝒕  -0.0058. 
(0.0034) 
0.0059 * 
(0.0035) 
-0.0059** 
(0.002) 
-0.0059** 
(0.002) 
𝚫𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕  -0.099. 
(0.059) 
-0.099. 
(0.058) 
-0.099** 
(0.045) 
-0.099** 
(0.045) 
𝚫𝑷𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒕  1.044** 
(0.35) 
1.03*** 
(0.35) 
1.044*** 
(0.35) 
1.03 *** 
(0.34) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 
R-squared 0.1118 0.1121 0.1314 0.1328 
   
  
VIII 
 
 
TEST 1 
We test for the significance of including year dummies using stata’s testparm 
testparm i.YEAR 
 
 ( 1)  2.YEAR = 0 
 ( 2)  3.YEAR = 0 
 ( 3)  4.YEAR = 0 
 ( 4)  5.YEAR = 0 
 ( 5)  6.YEAR = 0 
 ( 6)  7.YEAR = 0 
       Constraint 2 dropped 
 
           chi2(  5) =  417.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000   
We regect H0 and conclude the the inclusion of year dummies are significant. 
 
TEST 2 
In table A17 we present the alternative estimate of fixed and random effects of our equation 2 
in order to choose the most suitable method. 
Judge, et al. (1988) propose the following simple rules: 
1. If T is large and N small, there is little difference in the parameter estimates of FE and 
RE models. Hence computational convenience prefers FE model. 
2. If N is large and T small, the two methods differ. If cross-sectional units in the sample are 
random drawings from a larger sample, RE model is appropriate; otherwise, FE model. 
3. If the individual error component, 𝜇𝑖, and one or more regressors are correlated, RE 
estimators are biased and FE estimators unbiased 
4. If N is large and T small, and if the assumptions of RE modeling hold, RE estimators are 
more efficient. 
A simple solution is to run a Hausman test to see whether a fixed-effects or random effects 
model is more appropriate.  
Hausman test is a test of 
H0: random effects would be consistent and efficient, versus 
H1: random effects would be inconsistent. 
IX 
 
The test revealed a prob> chi2=0.96 >0.05 so we accept the null hypothesis and conclude that 
RE is more suitable. The tests imply that the zone effects though present in the 
data set are not correlated with the explanatory variables, and can very well be taken as random; 
the RE estimators will be consistent and efficient. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3 The natural logarithm of the weekly zonal price volatility. Own elaboration on GME and Thomson Reuters’s data 
 
 
Table A17  Descriptive statistics of the weekly zonal price volatility. Own elaboration on GME’s data. 
As we can see from the table, all zones present, on average, higher weekly price volatilities than 
the national weekly price volatility. In particular, Sicily and Sardinia exhibit greatest zonal price 
volatility.  
 
 
 
 
 Italy North C-North C-South South Sicily Sardinia 
Mean 
(Sd) 
1.582 
(0.489) 
1.642 
(0.522) 
1.634 
(0.483) 
1.6331 
(0.498) 
1.595 
(0.509) 
1.943 
(0.657) 
1.794 
(0.628) 
Max 3.014 3.042 3.042 3.050 3.055 4.047 4.14 
Min -0.028 -0.487 -0.090 -0.25 -0.152 -0.394 0.26 
 
